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Bertrand Russell once characterized mathematics
as the science in which no one knows what he is

talking about, nor whether what he is saying is true.

Many philosophers, and

a few

mathematicians, have

attempted to provide accounts of what it

is that math-

ematicians are talking about when they do mathematics.
These accounts fall into five major categories:

Pla-

tonism or Mathematical Realism, Nominalism, Conceptu-

alism or Constructivism, Logicism, and Psychologism.
Mathematical Ontology in Aristotle is an attempt
to elucidate Aristotle's account of the objects that

mathematicians investigate.

The thesis of the disser-

tation is that, though there are elements of Constructivism, and even of Platonism, in Aristotle's account
of mathematical objects, his mathematical ontology is

most accurately classified as

a

form of Nominalism.

V

Psychologism and Logicism are relatively new attempts at providing an ontological foundation for

mathematics, and there is nothing in Aristotle to suggest that his mathematical ontology falls into either

category

Constructivism, in a well-developed form, is also
a rather recent development.

Nonetheless, there are

passages in Aristotle which suggest that he is in sym-

pathy with a Constructivist account of mathematical
objects.

Several recent articles on Aristotle's math-

ematical ontology suggest interpretations which are

distinctly Constructivist in flavor.

I

argue that,

despite the strains of Constructivism to be found in
some of Aristotle's remarks, Constructivism does not
fit well with Aristotle's general philosophy of science, and that he should not be interpreted as offering
a

Constructivist ontology for mathematics.
Platonism is dismissed as

a

possible Aristotelian

ontology, on the basis of Aristotle's lengthy and vehe-

ment arguments against Platonic accounts of number and
figure
The dissertation opens with a general discussion of

mathematical ontology.

The general features of Aristo-

vi

tslisn science

sire

described, and

I

argue that pro~

viding an ontological foundation for an Aristotelian
science involves giving an account of the existence
of the genus which that science investigates.

I

then propose a mathematical ontology for Aristotle

which takes as the objects of mathematics particular
quantitative properties of sensible substances.

The

dissertation concludes with a discussion of Aristotle's
account of infinity

,

and the consequences of that ac-

count for mathematics.
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INTRODUCTION
kittle has been done in the way of systematic

explication of Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics.
This is due in part, no doubt, to the widely held

opinion that Aristotle was not himself much of a mathematician.

Though he frequently draws on mathematics

examples to illustrate various points he makes
a tout science in general, we do not find in Aristotle's

works original contributions to the development of the

mathematical sciences.
A second factor which discourages speculation about
Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics is the sparsity of
material with which to work.

Metaphysics

I

provides a

fairly thorough discussion of unity and of what it is to
be one, but barely mentions numbers in general.

Meta-

physics M and N contain the only protracted discussions
of mathematical issues, but they are concerned primarily

with arguments against various forms of Platonism.

Any

positive alternative to the theories of his predecessors
is offered by Aristotle merely as a suggestion in rela-

tively brief and scattered passages.

At no point do we

find Aristotle undertaking a clear presentation of a co-

herent overall theory.

IX

But mathematics raises interesting problems
as a
science within the context of Aristotle's
philosophy.

On the one hand, the mathematical sciences
are offered
as paradigms of demonstrative science,

the general

features of which Aristotle spells out in the
Posterior
Analytics.

It follows from the Posterior Analytics
dis-

cussion that demonstrative sciences must investigate
existent objects.

On the other hand, Aristotle's Metaphys-

ics takes as its central tenet the claim that all
that

exists are sensible substances and the modifications of
sensible substances.

(One noteworthy exception to this

view is the existence of first movers, which are nonsensible substances.

But while mathematical laws may

apply to first movers, the first movers are not at any
rate the sole or proper subject matter of mathematics).
The question then arises, how can a science as abstract
as mathematics apparently is, be given a concrete, exis-

tent subject matter with which to deal?

It is my pur-

pose in this dissertation to answer that question.

Chapter one simply sets out the problem to be solved,
and briefly discusses some previous interpretations of

Aristotle's views on the existence of numbers and geometric objects.

X

Chapter two offers a general description of Aristotle’s account of demonstrative science.

focus on

I

Jaakko Hintikka's account of Aristotelian science
offered
in his paper,

ence

,

"On the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Sci-

and on two replies to that paper, one by Gareth

Matthews and one by Lynn Rose.

Matthews argues, success-

fully I think, that Hintikka's account of Aristotelian

science is seriously defective.

But for my purposes, the

important element in Hintikka's description of Aristotelian science is the notion that a demonstrative science

assumes the existence of the subject genus for that science, and

argue that Matthews' objections do not touch

I

on that aspect of Hintikka's account.

cifically to the idea that

Rose objects spe-

a science assumes,

proves, the existence of its subject genus.

whatever the merits of Rose's own proposal as

rather than
argue that

I

a

method-

olcjy for science, it will not do as an interpretation
of Aristotle's views on the structure of demonstrative

science.

element in

conclude, with Hintikka, that one essential

I

a

demonstrative science is the assumption of

the existence of the subject genus which that science

investigates.

The problem of providing ontological foun-

dations for mathematics then centers on an account of the

existence of the subject-genera for Arithmetic and Geome try

XI

Chapter three takes up the problem of finding the

subject-genus of Arithmetic.

Various alternatives are

considered and rejected, and Number is finally settled
on as the genus of that science.

I

then offer an account

of the existence of numbers as properties of collections,

propose solutions to various objections that have been
raised to such accounts,

(most notably, those raised by

Gottlob Frege in The Foundations of Arithmetic

)

,

and

discuss the strictures which such an account places on

certain Arithmetical operations, such as addition and

multiplication.

Finally,

propose an account of the

I

differentiae of the species of Number, and attempt to
show why it is that counting the things in a collection
tells us what numerical property that collection has.
In chapter four

,

I

argue that an interpretation of

Aristotle which takes Geometric Figure as the genus of
Geometry is unacceptable.

I

consider in detail Ian

Mueller's paper, "Aristotle on Geometric Objects", and
take issue with his interpretation at various points.

I

propose that the genus which Geometry investigates is
Extension, and that its species are One-, Two-, and Three-

dimensional Extension.

I

conclude with a discussion of

the existence and nature of geometric figures, such as

triangles, cubes, etc.

Xll

Chapter five is concerned with Aristotle's account
of infinity.
tion, and

I

The aim here is primarily one of exposi-

rely heavily on Hintikka's paper, "Aristo-

telian Infinity", for that purpose.
sequences of Aristotle

metic and Geometry.

'

s

I

point out the con-

views on infinity for both Arith-

Finally,

I

argue that Hintikka's ef-

forts to show that Geometry is deficient given Aristotle's

views on infinity are unsuccessful.

I

have relied primarily on the Oxford translation of

Aristotle's works, and all quotations are taken from that
translation, unless otherwise indicated.

1

CHAPTER

I

MATHEMATICAL ONTOLOGY

In both the Metaphysics and the Posterior
Analytics^ Aristotle characterizes science as
the investiga-

tion of the essential nature of some subject
matter:

Every demonstrative science investigates,
with regard to some subject matter, the
essential attributes, from the common opinions
(Met.

B,

997al9

-

21)

Every demonstrative science has three elements:
(1) that which it posits, the subject genus whose essential attributes it
investigates
Post An.
.

.

(

In chapter two,

I

.

shall argue that sciences are indi-

viduated on the basis of their respective subject genera:

an individual science is concerned with the in-

vestigation of some one specific genus.

For the moment,

my concern is merely to point out the close connection
for Aristotle between knowledge of essential nature,

which is the goal of science, and the existence of that
whose essential nature is known.

That there is

a

dependence of our knowledge of any

thing's essential nature on the existence of that thing
is argued for most carefully in chapters seven and eight

2

of Book B of the Posterior Analytics

.

Aristotle repeat-

edly emphasizes that knowledge of the essential
nature
of what does not exist is impossible:
To put it another way:
how shall we by
definition prove essenti al nature
he who
knows what human - or any other - nature is
must know also that man exists; for no one'
knows the nature of what does not exist one can know the meaning of the phrase or
name 'goat-stag' but not what the essential
nature of a goat-stag is.
Post An
92b3 - 7)
:

.

(

.

,

We cannot apprehend a thing's definable form
without apprehending that it exists, since
we cannot know its essential nature while we
are ignorant whether it exists.
Post An
93al9)
.

(

.

,

Since a science investigates essential nature, and the

essential nature of what does not exist is not knowable,
it is clear that a viable science requires an existent

subject matter.

But this requirement is certainly mini-

mal, and does not seem to narrow significantly the pos-

sibilities from which to choose

a

mathematical ontology.

For example, Mathematical Platonism, sometimes called
"Mathematical Realism", easily satisfies the requirement
that the objects investigated by mathematics exist.
a

Given

Platonic ontology, the mathematical sciences investigate

the essential natures of abstract, non-sensible

,

and

(on

most Platonic theories) eternally existent objects that
are apprehended solely by the intellect.

Geometry inves-

3

tigates the essential natures of
triangles, cubes, and
the like, which really exist in
a non-physical
realm,

quite independently of the mind which
reasons about them.
Similarly, numbers, which are investigated
by Arithmetic,
are non-sensible objects whose existence
is in no way dependent upon the existence of minds. if
one adopts a

Platonic ontology for mathematics, there is
no difficulty
in satisfying the Posterior Analytics
requirement
that

mathematics investigate an existent subject matter.
But, of course. Platonism will not do as an
ontology
for mathematics within the context of
Aristotle's meta-

physics.

In the Metaphysics

,

Aristotle argues repeatedly

and at considerable length against not only the Theory
of

Forms, but also against many formulations of Mathematical

Platonism.

Indeed, he takes pains to exhaust the possible

interpretations of claims like "Numbers are independently

existent non— sensible entities", and to show that on none
of these interpretations is the claim acceptable.

particularly Metaphysics

M)

.

(cf.

Thus, the import of the re-

striction placed on science by the Posterior Analytics
can not be fully appreciated unless viewed in conjunction

with Aristotle's metaphysical position.

Constructivism may be characterized loosely as the
view that the objects of mathematics are simply concepts

4

produced by the mind.

As such, the objects of mathe-

matics are clearly dependent for their
existence on the
existence of minds, which produce or
construct them.

Several recent attempts to explicate
Aristotle's

mathematical ontology provide interpretations
which contain a strong Constructivist strain. Jaakko
Hintikka,

in his paper "Aristotelian Infinity",

1

says:

What is also clear is that Aristotle repeatinsists that actualization in one's mind
is in principle as good a sort of actualizaany other.
Aristotle wants to apply
his principle that "everything comes out of
that which actually is" (De Anima, III. 7,
4 31a3-4
to artificial products like houses...
The obvious connection between these passages
and Aristotle's discussion of the temporal
priority of the actual in Metaphysics IX, 8,
1049bl8-29 shows that the thought (or image)
which one has in one s mind when one knows x
is for Aristotle as fully actual an instance
of the form of x as an external object exemplifying this form.
This parity of actualization in thought
with actualization in external reality is
what leads me to say that for Aristotle conceivability implied actualizability
According to Aristotle, to conceive of a form in
one's mind was ipso facto to actualize it.
This idea is also applied by Aristotle to
mathematical entities. They exist only in
thinking, but since thinking is an actuality,
they are not any less real for this reason.
)

1

;

.

Mathematical entities seem to be concepts produced or

constructed by the mind.
1.

They exist, and are properly

a

Hintikka, Jaakko.
"Aristotelian Infinity", Phil Rev,
vo 1 LXXV 1966.
Pages 197 - 218.
.

,

5

subject for scientific investigation, but
they exist only
in the mind.
Any putative mathematical entity which
can-

not be conceived or pictured by the mind,

(an infinite

extension, for example, or a set with infinite
cardinality)

,

is not legitimately an object to be
investigated

by science, because it does not exist and
therefore its

essential nature can not be known.
In his influential paper,

Objects',

"Aristotle on Geometrical

Ian Mueller argues that geometric figures are

objects which are the result of imposing geometric properties, such as triangularity, on intelligible matter, which

Mueller takes to be spatial extension.

Though Mueller

does not commit himself explicitly on the nature of this

"imposition" of properties, it seems reasonable to sup-

pose that the imposition is carried out by the mind.

For

Aristotle repeatedly asserts that no physical object satisfies the geometer's definitions:

touch a brass sphere at a point,

(

an iron bar does not

998a5

)

.

If these

geometric properties are not stamped on intelligible matter by nature, if geometric figures are no where to be

found in the physical world, it is reasonable to suppose

that it is the mind which does the stamping, and that the

objects which result exist only in the realm of thought.
2.

Mueller, Ian.
"Aristotle on Geometrical Objects",
Archiv f Or Geschichte der Philosophie vol. LII, 1970.

6

Finally,

m

a work still in progress, Julia
Annas

ascribes to Aristotle an account of number
which also
makes these mathematical entities mind-dependent.
Though
at one point she argues that Aristotle is
not a Constructivist, she encapsulates her interpretation
of Aristotle's
account of number as follows:
Aristotle s concept of number, in making number relative to what is numbered, ties number
firmly to counting, making it analytic that
number is what we count with. This is a suitably anti -Platonis tic theory: numbers do not
exist independently of us and our activities
of counting.
|

If Annas is correct then, for Aristotle, numbers
do not

exist anywhere but in the mind.

While they may have ap-

plication to things in the physical world,
used to count things in that world)
s elves

things in that world:

,

(they can be

they are not them-

they are neither physical

objects nor properties of physical objects.

They exist

only as conceptual tools in the mind of someone who

counts

Hintikka's interpretation is perhaps the least non-

committal in its consignment of the objects of mathematics to the realm of thought, but all three of these pro-

posals seem to grant the mind some indispensable role in

7

producing and maintaining the existence
of the objects
of mathematics.
If Hintikka is correct, and

the actuali-

zation of a form in thought is on a par,
onto logically

with the actualization of that form in
some physical object, there may be no objection, from
the point of view
° f the Posterior Analytics

,

to having a science which in-

vestigates the essential nature of purely mental
entities.
One might look to Metaphysics L for support
for the

claim that mathematical entities exist only in
thought.

Aristotle says:
For to be an act of thinking and to be
an object of thought are not the same thing.
We answer that in some cases the knowledge
is the object.
In the productive sciences
it is the substance or essence of the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical
sciences the definition or the act of thinking is the object.
Met L, 1074b37 ff)
(

Th. s

.

passage is rather obscure, and

do not profess to

I

know precisely what Aristotle is getting at here.

He

might be proposing some distinction of senses of 'thinking about'

.

He might be distinguishing cases where what

the mind thinks about is something other than the thought
of that thing, from cases where the thought of a thing

and the thing thought of are one and the same.

In the

former case, which apparently arises in the productive
sciences, there is an object, x, and

a

mental event, the

8

act of thinking of x or of having
the thought of x, which
is the act of the mind's adopting
the form of x.
Because
the mind adopts the form of x, it
is thinking about X/
and there is something distinct from
the mind and its activity which the mind is thinking about.
In the latter
case which arises in the theoretical
sciences, there is
no object distinct from the thought
itself.
There is only
the mind's adoption of a form, which is
not a form had by
anything else, except perhaps by another mind
thinking
/

the same thought.

To say that the mind is thinking about

an object in this case is not to say that
there is an object distinct from the mind whose form the mind
has adopted, but rather simply that the mind has adopted
a certain

form.

The thought, and the object thought about

(in this

sense), are the same.
if Aristotle is proposing anything like this, and as-

serting that in the case of theoretical sciences, the
thought and the object of thought are always the same,
then the passage supports a Constructivist interpretation
of Aristotle's mathematical ontology.
a

theoretical science.

For mathematics is

If the objects which mathematicians

think about and investigate simply are thoughts, then it
seems that the objects of mathematics exist only in the

realm of thought, and that they are completely mind-dependent.

9

There is a problem with this line of
reasoning,

however.

Physics is included as a theoretical
science

along with mathematics and theology.

Yet it is im-

plausible in the extreme to suppose that
Aristotle
thought that his philosophy of nature
investigated

purely mental entities.

And if one supposes that the

objects of Arithmetic and Geometry are mentally
dependent in some stronger sense than are the
objects of
Physics, one is left puzzling over the inclusion
of

Astronomy as a mathematical science.

Surely the objects

investigated by astronomers are more akin to those in-

vestigated by physicists than to entities constructed
by the mind.

If the objects of Arithmetic and Geometry

the latter, one would reasonably expect Aristotle
to classify Astronomy with Physics, rather than with

mathematics
Furthermore, if we accept a Constructivist ontology
of mathematics as an interpretation of Aristotle, his

remark in the Posterior Analytics regarding the term
'goat-stag'
bove)

.

is difficult to understand,

(see page 2,

a-

If mathematics can discover the essential nature

of entities which are nothing more than concepts formed
by the mind, what precludes us from obtaining knowledge

of the essential nature of goat-stags?

instantiation of

a

If the mental

form is on the same ontological foot-

10

mg

as its instantiation in a physical
object, then it

would seem that, given that
goat-stag since

I

I

can form an image of a

know the meaning of the term, the es-

sential nature of goat-stags is every
bit as accessible
as that of cows.
At the very least, it is as accessible
that of mathematical entities

Finally

,

a

Constructivist ontology seems to violate

the spirit, if not the letter, of Aristotle's
philosophy
of science.

An objection which he consistently levels

against both the Theory of Forms and Platonic
ontologies
of mathematics is that they are devoid of
explanatory

power.

There is no reason to suppose that knowledge of

entities which have an eternal, abstract existence is in
any way connected to knowledge of the physical world.

Postulating

a form,

Redness, brings us no closer to an

explanation of why physical objects are red.

It is not

easy to see how a Constructivist ontology of mathematics
fares any better from this point of view.

Why is it

that knowledge of concepts constructed by the mind, con-

cepts which are not of anything outside the mind, has

application to the physical world?
It seems to me,
a

then, that it is misleading to place

very heavy emphasis on those passages in Aristotle

which suggest a Constructivist ontology.

What, then, is

to be made of the passage from Metaphysics L?

First, as

11

have pointed out, it seems that any
significance which
that passage has for determining
Aristotle's ontology
for mathematics, it also has for
determining his ontology for Physics.
I am no more tempted to
describe Aristotle as a Constructivist, on the basis
of that rather
obscure passage, than I am tempted to
describe him as
an Idealist.
I

Some light may be shed on the Metaphysics
L passage
by an apparently similar claim put forward
in

De_

Anima:

The so-called abstract objects the mind
thinks just as, if one had thought of the
snub-nosed not as snub-nosed but as hollow,
one would have thought of an actuality without the flesh in which it is embodied
it
thus that the mind when it is thinking
the ob jec i_s of mathematics thinks as separ —
a te
elements which do not exist separate.
In every case the mind which is actively
thinking is the objects which it thinks.
De Anima III. 7, 431bl3-17)
:

,

(

As

I

understand him, Aristotle is here suggesting that

mathematicians are reasoning about entities whose existence is inseparably bound up with the existence of sensible substances.

The mathematician investigates the

essential nature of entities which exist only as modifications of substances.

But to facilitate his investiga-

tion, the mathematician ignores the substance in which
the entity is embodied, and thinks of the entity as

though it existed separately.

Mathematical entities

12

exist separately, then, only in
thought.
But mathematics no more investigates
entities with a purely mental
existence than does Physics. The
physicist considers
sensible substances merely gua
moveable, and ignores
every other aspect of them. That
which is moveable-andnothing-else exists only in the mind,
just as that which
is extended- and -no thing-else
exists only
in the mind.

But neither Physics nor Geometry is
investigating the
essential nature of entities that have a
purely mental
existence.
They are investigating the essential
nature
of modifications of sensible substances.
This interpretation is supported by Metaphysics
M.3:
Since it is true to say without crualification that not only things which are
separable but also things which are inseparable exist, (for instance, that mobiles
exist)
it is also true to say without
gualif ication that the objects of mathematics exist, and with the character ascribed to them by Mathematicians. And as
it is true to say of the other sciences too
without qualification that they deal with
such and such a subject - not with what is
accidental to it, (e.g. not with the pale,
if the healthy thing is pale, and the science has healthy as its subject)
but with
that which is the subject of each science with the healthy if it treats its object
qu a healthy, with man if qua man;
so too
is it with geometry;
if its subjects happen to be sensible, though it does not
treat of them qua sensible, the mathematical sciences will not for that reason be
sciences of sensibles - nor, on the other
hand, of other things separate from sensibles.
*

*

•

,

,

(Met.

M,

10 77b31 -

78a5)

13

In the chapters which follow,

I

will offer an in-

terpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of
mathematics
which is much more closely aligned with
Nominalism than
with Constructivism. Nominalism is the
most conservative
of metaphysical positions, postulating
the existence of

entities only when those entities are absolutely
essential to a satisfactory explanatory theory.
Nominalists
do not countenance the existence of
universals,

and, in

general, do not countenance the existence of
abstract objects of any sort whatever,

(Nelson Goodman is a notable

exception to this latter point).

Mathematics, for Ari-

stotle, will be construed as a science investigating
the

essential natures of particular quantitative properties
of sensible substances.

To be sure, there will be hints

of Constructivism along the way.

Geometric figures will

be construed as purely mental entities, but

I

will argue

they are merely conceptual tools used to facilitate
the investigation of extension

physical objects.

I

-

the extendedness of

will also point out that Aristotle

would adopt an essentially Constructivist position with
regard to the possibility of transfinite mathematics.
But taken as a whole, the interpretation which

offer is Nominalistic in tenor.

I

shall

14

CHAPTER

II

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ARISTOTELIAN
SCIENCE

There are a number of questions
which we must consider in some detail before attempting
to solve certain
problems of existence more or less
peculiar to matheas an Aristotelian science.
In answering the question,

'What is a science?',

two distinct elements must be taken
into account.
is a characterization of a method
of inquiry:

One

some

criteria ought to be provided which an
investigation
must satisfy if it is to qualify as a
scientific investigation.

The second element involves the body of

propositions or beliefs which make up the science, and
the criteria which a given set of beliefs must
satisfy

in order to be correctly described as a science.

I

shall consider the first of these elements later in this
chapter, in a discussion of the role of syllogisms in
science.

For the moment, my concern will be the criteria

which determine whether a given set of propositions qualifies as a science, and this will involve subsidiary issues regarding the object of scientific knowledge and the

individuation of
ence

.

a

body of scientific knowledge as

a

sci-

15

M etaphysics A opens with
knowledge.

There, art

(C«XvV

a brief
)

genealogy of

and science

are contrasted with experience

:

)

the for-

mer involve understanding and are
concerned with universal judgements and with the reasons
why something is
the case;
the latter is concerned exclusively
with
particulars, and is content with the
knowledge that
something is the case. So one may learn
by experience
that this A will produce a particular
B, but one who
possesses the art or science appropriate to
A's and B's

w iH know also why A produces B.

Posterior Analytics seems to offer a second,

distinct criterion distinguishing art and science
from
experience.

The Metaphysics proposes that art arises

from experience when universal judgements about
classes
of objects are drawn from particular experiences:

"Now

arises when from many notions gained by experience
one universal judgement about a class of objects is pro-

duced

,

(9

81a 5

)

.

The Poster ior Analytics emphasizes

knowledge of the causes of a thing as the important characteristic of scientific or artistic knowledge.

It may

be thought that these criteria will pick out different

classes of judgements as falling under art or science.
For example, a physician might well know the universal

proposition that circular wounds heal quickly, but not

16

have the slightest idea why they do.

if we adopt the

apparently weaker criterion of art and
science, he will
have artistic or scientific knowledge,
simply because
he knows the universal proposition
in question.
If, on
the other hand, we adopt the apparently
stronger
cri-

terion, that scientific or artistic
knowledge is knowledge of the reason why, it would seem
that the physician does not have scientific or artistic
knowledge.
It would be a mistake, however,

to take "reason why"

in a sense strong enough to produce this
result.

For

Aristotle, a perfectly acceptable answer to the
question
Why is X a Y?
is an answer to the effect that
X is a

,

Z,

and Z's are Y's.

Indeed, for Aristotle, the best

possible answer to the question "Why is X

which asserts that X's are G's, where G is
Y,

a Y?",

is one

a genus

or Y-ness, as part of its essential nature.

having

Thus Ari-

stotle is not hesitant to describe the physician as knowi n<rT

the reason why some particular circular wound will

heal quickly.
It should be pointed out that not any universal prop-

osition will count either as artistic or as scientific
knowledge.

First of all, of course, the universal judge-

ment must be true.

The physician might assert that this

wound will heal quickly because it was inflicted on

a

17

Cypriot, and Cypriots heal quickly.

Supposing that

generalization to be false, the
physician would not be
practicing the medical art at all,
in Aristotle's view,
even if the treatment he prescribed
were precisely appropriate to the injury. More
interestingly, a universal judgement falls within an art
or science only
if it

is the broadest generalization
of a given instance.

For

example, if the physician believes
that it is because
this wound was inflicted with an
ice-pick that it will

heal quickly, he again fails to practice
the medical art.
For this wound will heal quickly, not
because it was inflicted with an ice-pick, but because ice-pick
wounds
are circular, and circular wounds heal
quickly.
This

requirement Aristotle calls "commensurate universality",
and

I

shall have more to say of it later.

Scientific or artistic judgements about

a

particular

case, then, are judgements that that case falls under
a

certain general principle, that general principle being
the broadest true generalization of which the given par-

ticular case is an instance.

But if both art and science

are distinguished from experience on the ground that they

deal with universals, on what basis is science

distinguished from art

(

'tV>V 9 )?
>

(klfur £’?/'>?)
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Aristotle does not draw a
distinction between art
and science in Metaphysics
A, but he does distinguish
art from science in the
Nichomachean
Ethics:

"Therefore, the object of scientific
knowledge is of necessity... Scientific knowledge,
then, is a state of capacity to demonstrate", (E.N.,
1139b22 - 35).
Scientific
knowledge of a proposition seems
to require that one
have the ability to produce a
demonstration
)

of a certain sort which has
that proposition as its conclusion.
(In fact, this requirement can
not hold for all

propositions of which one can have scientific
knowledge,
since the basic truths of each science
are indemonstrable.)
On the other hand, "... art is
identical with a
state of capacity to make, involving a
true course of

reasoning.

All art is concerned with coming into being,

that is, with contriving and considering
how something

may come into being which is capable of either
being or
not being... for art is concerned neither with
things
that are, or come into being, necessarily, nor
with

things that do so in accordance with nature..."
1140a9

-

bl4

(E.N.,

)

Notice the emphasis on capacities in these accounts

both science and art are abilities to do certain sorts of
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things.

it is on the differences in
the sorts of things

one does that emphasis must
be laid in distinguishing

art from science, and not on
features of the bodies of
knowledge involved.
There is the claim that the
objects
of science exist necessarily,
whereas the objects of art
exist contingently:
an example of the former might
be
one of the elements, of the latter,
a house, chair, or
some other artifact.
But such a distinction is not adequate to distinguish the body of
knowledge constituting
a science from that constituting
an art.
The object of
a science is that about which we
have knowledge, and it
exists necessarily, (either by logical or
by natural
necessity). The object of an art is that
which is produced, using the knowledge which constitutes
the art,

and that object exists contingently, because
it might

have happened that an object of that kind never
was
produced.

But it does not follow from this that the ob-

ject of the knowledge involved in the art exists only

contingently.

Indeed, the capacity to build seems to

presuppose an extensive knowledge of the very propositions demonstrated by natural science.

One can not

distinguish science from art on the ground that one consists of propositions of a certain sort, and the other

consists of propositions of a different sort, because it
seems that the same propositions will be part of both
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science and art.

Rather, the distinction seems
to be
very close to that which we
draw between pure science and
applied science. It is not that
the propositions themselves differ in kind, but rather
the way in which we employ those propositions, that
distinguishes art from science.
Science uses knowledge of its
propositions to demonstrate other propositions, art uses
knowledge of its
propositions to make things.
In chapter three of Metaphysics E
,

(1025b25), Ari-

stotle does not distinguish art from
science at all.
instead, he distinguishes three kinds of
science:
theoretical science, practical science, and
productive science.
The account of productive science coincides
with
the

Ethics account of art, whereas the theoretical
sciences
are those which, in the narrower sense of the
Ethics, are

simply sciences.

Both involve knowledge, but the end of

each kind differs from the others:
fic knowledge is knowledge

:

the end of scienti-

the theoretical sciences are

ends in themselves, and if their propositions are used at
all, it is only in the pursuit of further knowledge.

The

end of the productive sciences, or the arts, is again the

making of things.

The end of practical science is the

determination of action.
Mathematics, along with natural science and theology,
is a theoretical science.

Scientific knowledge in the
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strict sense, we have seen, is
a state of capacity to
demonstrate. The theoretical
sciences, then, will be
first of all demonstrative, so
our discussion hereafter
will be confined to a characterization
of the general
features of demonstrative science.

Science is distinguished from art
in that its end
is knowledge.
But knowledge of what? in Metaphysics
B,
Aristotle says:
"Every demonstrative science investigates, with regard to some subject
matter, the essential
attributes, from the common opinions,"
(997al9).

P osterior Analytics,

however, we find:

in the

"We suppose our-

selves to have unqualified scientific
knowledge of a
thing... when we know the cause on which
the fact depends,
as the cause of that fact and no
other..."

Again,

"We think we have scientific knowledge
when we know

the cause, and there are four causes:

form,
(3)

(71b8 - 12).

(2)

(1)

the definable

an antecedent which necessitates a consequent,

the efficient cause,

(4)

the final cause",

(94a20).

If we take the goal of science to be scientific know-

ledge of particular things, these accounts differ.

For

the essential attributes of a thing have to do with its

formal cause, yet the Posterior Analytics includes not

only this, but the final, material, and efficient causes
as well,

as objects of scientific inquiry.

Thus the Post-
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erior An alytics gives a broader
account of the purpose
of a demonstrative science than
does the Metaphysics
.

We can avoid this difficulty if
we distinguish two
senses for each of the terms 'scientific
object' and
'object of a science'.
I shall argue that a
particular
science is concerned primarily with the
essential attributes of some genus, and that it is
this genus which is

the object of the science in the primary
sense.

It is

this scientific object whose essential
attributes the
science investigates, and it is knowledge
of these essen-

tial attributes which is first and foremost
the goal of
the science.
Knowledge of these essential attributes is

obtained by investigating particular objects, both
within
and outside of this genus, and the species which
fall un-

der the genus, and discovering the various causes
of

those objects.

These particular objects are objects of

the science in an incidental sense, in so far as they
are

objects which the science examines to obtain the knowledge

which is its end.

Scientific demonstrations proving that

species have certain properties will, as Aristotle puts
it,

exhibit" the essential nature of the genus.

Thus,

acquiring scientific knowledge of particulars is not the
end of science, but merely a step toward that end, which
is knowledge of the essential nature of some genus.
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Consider, for example, a science
of color.
The end
of this science is knowledge
of the essential nature
of
the genus Color.
Knowledge of that essential
nature win
be acquired, however, by
investigation of the various
species of Color: Red, Blue, etc.
But knowledge of those
species will in turn depend upon
the investigation of various colored objects.
Discovering the essential nature
of
Color will require the investigation
of substances,
the

material causes of substances,

(glass, wood, etc.), the

interaction of surfaces with light, etc.

Knowledge of the

causes of substances is not the proper
end of the science
of Color, because substances do not
fall under the genus
Color.

Nonetheless, substances are in a sense
objects of
the science, in so far as the investigation
of substances
is necessary for the discovery of the
essential nature of

Color.

But there is an important difference between
this

loose sense of 'object of a science'

,

and the sense in

which the genus of a science is the object of the science,
for it is knowledge of the essential nature of the genus

only which is the end of the science.
In the Posterior Analytics we find a brief character-

ization of demonstrative science which makes clear the im-

portance of the genus as the subject the investigation of

which is the concern of the science:

Every demonstrative
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science has three elements:

(1)

that which it posits,

the subject genus whose essential
attributes it investigates,
(2) the so-called axioms,
primary premisses
of its demonstrations;
(3) the attributes, the meaning
(but not the existence) of which
it assumes",
(76bl2).

Moreover, it is on the basis of the
genus with which
a science is concerned that
the science is individuated:
"A single science is one whose
domain is a single genus",
(87a37

That this genus which individuates
the science
is the central concern of that
science is suggested in
)

.

the Metaphysics:

"Therefore to investigate the essential

attributes of one class of things, starting
from one set
of beliefs, is the business of one
science",
(997a20).

The end of a demonstrative science is clearly
the
knowledge of the essential nature of some genus.
But
v iat

'

role does syllogism play in demonstrative
science?

There can be no doubt that

a

demonstrative science does

not demonstrate that certain attributes are
essential to
the genus with which it is concerned, because demonstra-

tion of essential nature is impossible,

(cf.

seven through nine of the Posterior Analytics

chapters
)

.

Nonethe-

less, it is through syllogism that essential nature is

exhibited.

There is disagreement over precisely how the

syllogism functions in exhibiting essential nature, and
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how it functions as a tool of
science.

Let us now con-

sider some of these varying
interpretations.
In "On the Ingredients of an
Aristotelian Science",

3

Jaakko Hintikka characterizes
syllogisms along the lines
presented in the Prior Analytics
A syllogism is produced by inserting a term as the
"middle" between two
other terms, this middle term being
such that its extension stands as superset to the extension
of
.

one of the

original terms, and as subset to the
extension of the
other.
One can insert further middle terms,
producing

syllogistic chain which expresses the relation
holding
among the elements of a nested sequence
of
a

sets.

A particular science is one which deals with
an individual genus, and this genus, according to
Hintikka,
functions as the universal set or domain for the
science
in question.

That is, the genus is not itself a proper

subset of any set with which the science is concerned,
and every set with which the science is concerned is a

subset of the genus.
on Hintikka'

s

The ideal of a completed science,

interpretation, is the setting out of se-

quences of nested sets such that:

(1)

for each species

falling under the subject-genus, there is a nested sequence
3.

Hintikka, Jaakko.
"On the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Science", Nous vol. VI, 1972. Pages 55 - 69.
,
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of supersets terminating with
the genus;
(2) for any
such nested sequence, if A
immediately follows B in the
sequence, then there is no set C
such that C could be
inserted in the sequence between A
and B without destroying the nested structure of
the sequence.
(This property
can only be included provided
some doctrine of natural
kinds is taken into account. Unless
A has only one more
element than B, we can always construct
a set C falling
between A and B which preserves the
nested structure of
the sequence, simply by adding one
element of A to B.
But these sequences are supposed to
reflect the speciesgenus relationship, and presumably the rather
artificial
set C would not be a species falling under
the genus of
the science, since there would be no
essence picking out
the elements of C.)
If we had a complete Aristotelian Zoology,
given

Hintikka's interpretation, then we would have a nested
sequence of sets picked out by the predicates:

Primate

,

Mammal

,

.

.

.

Animal

.

Man,

We would have a similar

sequence for each species of animal, and every such se-

quence would terminate with the genus Animal.

Moreover,

none of these sequences would have any gaps in them:

for

example, there would be no natural-kind term T which

picked out
every

S

a set S

such that every Primate was an

was a Mammal.

S

and
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Hintikka calls the relationship
holding between an
element in such a nested
sequence of
natural kinds and

its successor an "atomic
connection", because no middle
can be found which connects
the two.
Derivatively, if
the extensions of two terms
are atomically connected,
we
may say that the terms are
atomically connected. The

statement

'All A's are

B's\ where

and

'A'

'B'

are atom-

ically connected terms, is one
kind of immediate premiss.

Each set in one of these sequences
corresponds to
some species or sub-species of
the subject-genus of the
science.
To prove that all A's are C's,
according to
Hintikka, one constructs a syllogistic
chain, each premiss of which asserts an atomic
connection between two
sets, beginning with A and terminating
with C.

All A's are B^'s

where

'A

and

'B^

Thus:

are atomically

connected

All B^

'

s

are B^

'

where

'B^

and

'B^

are atomically

connected

AH

B

n

's

are C's

where

V

and

'c‘

are atomically

connected.

A completed science, then, would be a set of
such chains

linking every lowest species to the subject genus of the
science, through all of the appropriate superordinate

species
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It is Hintikka's view that
only in the case of the
subject-genus of a science is
existence

assumed.

For
each narrower term or species
name, „ e assume only the
meaning of that term. The existence
of the things which
fall within the extension of
that term follows from
the

fact that they fall under the
subject-genus.
in zoology we assume the
existence of animals.

assume the meaning of a term,

'horse'

m

For example,
We then

for example, and

demonstrating that horses are animals by
providing
a syllogistic chain linking
'horse' to

'animal', we at

the same time prove that horses
exist, because animals
do.
Thus the justification of the
ontological foundations of any particular science, on
Hintikka's account,

centers on the existence of the subject-genus
of that
science, because the existence of all of
the species and

individuals falling under that genus follows
from the
existence of the genus.
Various objections have been raised to Hintikka's
account of the structure of a science and the role
of
syllogisms in scientific explanation.

Gareth Matthews,

in a response to Hintikka entitled "Aristotelian Explana-

tion

4.

4
,

finds fault with the use of nested sets as a

Matthews, Gareth B., "Aristotelian Explanation".
Unpublished manuscript.
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characterization of scientific
explanation. He agrees
with Hintikka that the discussion
of syllogisms in the

—

1 °r

—

would lead one to expect
explanations
to utilize mediating terms:
terms whose extensions
fall between the extension of
the subject term and the
extension of the term predicated
of it.
But, he points
out, the Posterior Analytics
raises the unlooked-for
-

iLytlCS

requirement of commensurate universality 5
because A is B, then
and, what is more,

'B'

and 'C must be so related inten-

's'

the case that A is B because A is C.
,

if A is C

and 'C must be co-extensional

sionally that if A is C because A is

A nalytics

:

then it is not

B,

in the Posterior

then, explanation is not a purely
extensional

relationship.

Since

B
'

'

and

'

C'

are co-extensional, a

correct Aristotelian explanation of why A is
C will not
make use of nested terms in the way suggested

by Hintikka.

I

itthews calls Hintikka

1

's

nested-term explanations

mediating explanations", and explanations resting on
commensurate universality "first-subject explanations",
(the latter being derived from the fact that when B
and

C satisfy the two conditions stated,

5.

B will be what Ari-

Aristotle actually uses the simple
"universal", in his Posterior Analytics discussion of this
requirement, but it is clear that universality alone
is not the requirement he has in mind.
It is not enough that all B's are C's: it is necessary that
all and only B's are C's, as the discussion at Posterior Analytics 73b30 - 74a4 makes clear.
1

,
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stotle calls the "first subject"
of C)
To spell out the first-subject
theory of explanation more fully: we have a
sequence of terms, A
A
±

.

.

.

such that the extensions of these
terms are nested.
For
each A
there is a set of predicates such
i
that A^ is the
first subject of each of those
predicates. For any A.,
where j is less than or equal to i,
and B
where EL is
i
one of the predicates of which A.
is the first subject,
the proper Aristotelian explanation
for A ^ s being
is
that A_. is an A
(Notice that this yields the result
±
that an A., is B simply in virtue of
being
,

,

’

.

an A.

±

qua A.

l

that

A.
i

it is

is B.).
i

Matthews offers two arguments to show that
firstsubject explanations are preferable to mediating
explanations.

He argues first that the first-subject
approach

will guarantee uniqueness of the cause of A's
being C,

given only the reasonable assumption that C will
have
only one first subject.

The mediating explanation, on

the other hand, allows for non-uniqueness in two ways:

first, there will be more than one reason for A's being
C,

provided that there is

subordinate to
C.

B,

a species D

superordinate or

superordinate to A, and subordinate to

That is, if we have the sequence A:B:D:C, in order of

increasing generality, then

'A is C

because A is

D'

will
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be every bit as acceptable
an explanation as

because A is B'.

'A is C

'Man is an animal because man
is a

vertebrate' serves as an explanation
of man's animality every bit as well as, and
no better than, 'man is
an animal because man is a mammal'.

Non-uniqueness of explanation also arises
in
somewhat different form from co-ordinate

a

species:

if

B and B* are species of Cy then
something may be a C

either because it is a B or because it
is a B*.
thing is a mammal either because it is
a man,

cause it is a horse, or because

Some-

or be-

There are any num-

...

ber of reasons why something might be a
mammal.

Notice,

however, that we do not get non-uniqueness in
an explanation of why some specified A's are C's, since
for any

particular species A, A's will be
B s or

C s
'

because they are

because they are B*'s, but one and only one of

these explains why A's are C's.

This is because our

sequences are nested, so it can not be the case that A's
are C's for both reasons:

A's are B*'s.

either all A's are B's or all

Non-uniqueness arises from co-ordinate

species only when one asks "What is it to be a C?"

Matthews' second argument against Hintikka points
out that mediating explanations of the sort proposed are

either trivial or false.
of a certain sort.

Suppose that mallards are ducks

Then the explanation "This is a duck
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because it is a mallard" is trivial,
if we ignore the
qualification "of a certain sort". For
it reduces to
"This is a duck because it is a
duck".
But, Matthews
claims, including the differentia
in the explanation
yields something false: what makes
something a duck
is what is common to all species
of ducks, not what
differentiates a single species.
The alternatives offered by Hintikka
and Matthews

may appear to be more similar than in fact
they are.
Hintikka surely emphasizes the whole-part
relationship
in the premisses of a demonstration, citing
Aristotle's

remark that "the premisses from which a conclusion
follows are always related as whole and part",

(92al2)

But some of his own remarks are inconsistent with
this.
The first premisses of a science are called "generic

premisses

by Hintikka, and he characterizes them as

definitory reformulations of tautologies of the form
(1)

every G is a G ... hence perhaps something like

every G is a
if G'

G'

where

G'

serves to define G." Clearly,

serves to define G, then the extension of G can

not be nested in the extension of G'.
a

(2)

Further, there is

whole class of atomic premisses within a science, one

apparently for each kind-term with which the science
deals.

All such premisses Hintikka characterizes as "a

kind of definition of their subject terms".

None of these
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atomic premisses can be characterized
as expressing a
whole-part relationship, and they may
call to mind the
first-subject premisses of the Matthews
interpretation.
Clearly, there are two very different
kinds of
premiss
the Hintikka account.
One kind assert a
set-subset relationship, and these are
immediate if
there is no set falling between the
sets so related.
An entirely different sort of immediate
premiss is de-

m

finitory in nature, and has nothing whatever
to do with
the whole-part relationship.
is the Hintikka
account,

then, simply a version of Matthews'
interpretation

which emphasizes, or perhaps over-emphasizes

,

the ex-

tensional element of explanation?
It would be hasty to conclude that it is.
all, Hintikka

itthews

IV

'

s

First of

atomic premisses are not coincident with

commensurately universal premisses.

\

rA.

i

-1

is B

i

on Matthews' account, will predicate an essential attribute, B

i

,

of the species A

±

,

as its first subject.

On

Hintikka 's account, an immediate premiss of the form
rA
i

is B?

is a reformulation of a definition,

be the essence of A^

of it.

,

so B

i

must

not merely an essential attribute

Moreover, B^ can not be predicated of A^ at all,

since definitions never predicate.

Finally, if we are

,
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to take the definitional nature
of Hintikka's atomic

premisses seriously, there will be
only one such premiss
for each species.
On Matthews' account, there will
be
several such premisses for each
species, one for each
essential attribute of the species.
Essenial attributes seem to be those
which are necessarily connected with the essence of
a species, but
which are not themselves part of that
essence:
since
the species has essence E, it necessarily
has certain
attributes B, C, D.
it is essence which plays a major
role in Hintikka's account of explanation,
whereas

essential attributes carry the weight for
Matthews.

Hintikka's interpretation differs quite significantly from Matthews

'

.

But are these alternative in-

terpretations of the same thing?

A careful considera-

tion of the case shows that they are not:

Hintikka's

interpretation explicates one sort of syllogism and
explanation, while Matthews' interpretation explicates
an entirely distinct sort of explanatory syllogism.

Hintikka, emphasizing the Prior Analytics, is con-

cerned with the explanation of A's being C's, where
and

'A'

are kind-terms.

His account of such explana-

tions seems to be this:

we show that A's are B-^'s by

'C'
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showing that the essence of B
in the essence of A;

x

is contained or included

we show that E^'s are

showing that the essence of B
in the essence of

...

2

B^s

by

is contained or included

we show that B^

'

s

are C's by

showing that the essence of C is
contained or included
in the essence of B
n

.

Matthews is doing something quite different.

phasizing the Po sterior Analytics

,

he is concerned with

explanations of why A's are C, where
and

'

C'

is a predicate.

Em-

'A

1

is a kind-term

His commens urate ly universal

premisses therefore cannot be expressions of
essence,
since, if they were, his demonstrations would

be demon-

strations of essence, which are not possible in Aristotle's view.

Moreover, a circularity of explanation

would result if the commensurately universal premisses
were expressions of essence.

Suppose we have 'A's are

C because A's are B's', where

'A'

and

'C'

and

expresses the essence of B's.

'B'

are kind-terms

We have then as-

serted that A's are C because they are B's, but how do
we establish that A's are B's?

We cannot appeal to the

essences of A's and B's without making our explanation
circular.

Thus the first-subject explanations will not

do as accounts of essence.
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It can also be seen that
first-subject explanations

presuppose mediating explanations,
in so far as they
rely on a second premiss to
the effect that all A's are
B's.
Matthews' explanations take the
following
form:

B's are C,

(c

has B as its first-subject
and is an es-

sential attribute of B

'

s

)

A's are B's;

,

are c, in virtue of being B's.

therefore, A's

Establishing the second

premiss involves proving a class-inclusion,
precisely
the task with which Hintikka is
concerned.
Thus, the Matthews account does differ
significantly

from Hintikka'

s.

This difference reflects, not a change

in standards or methodology between
the Prior Analytics

and the Po sterior Analytics

,

but a change in purpose.

The Prior Analytics is concerned with
demonstrations of
•O.

3

class-inclusion, the Posterior Analytics with demonstrations of essential nature.

The accounts are not incon-

sistent accounts of the same thing, but accounts of
al-

together different things.

The Posterior Analytics ver-

sion of explanation does not contradict the Prior Analytics^

version, but presupposes and goes beyond it, under-

taking a different task of explanation.

Science is unquestionably concerned with essential
nature.

Thus it is demonstrations exhibiting essential
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nature which are important to
science, and scientific
explanations will involve syllogisms
of the sort described by Matthews. Hintikka's
account is indeed inadequate as an account of scientific
explanation, but
clearly it is not irrelevant to
such an account. Matthews is correct in asserting
that Hintikka's nested
sequences do not play a role in the
explanatory syllogism itself, but they are necessary
to establishing
the truth of the second premiss
of such a syllogism.
It is the explanatory syllogism
which "exhibits" es-

sential nature, and so it is explanatory
syllogisms
with which science is directly concerned.

What is important in all of this for my
purposes
is that Hintikka's claim, that
the ontological foundation of a science is the existence of
the subject-genus
of that science, is not affected by
Matthews'
more com-

plete account of scientific syllogism.

We can accept

Matthews’ account, or something like it, as a
more accurate interpretation of Aristotle's theory of
explanatory syllogisms, without rejecting Hintikka's proposal

entirely.

Hintikka has given an account of what is

presupposed by scientific syllogisms, but mistakenly
put forward that account as an account of the scientific syllogisms themselves.

His remarks on the ontolo-

gical importance of the subject-genus are quite correct
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however, and

shall now defend them against
an attack
levelled by Lynn Rose.
I

In his "Reply to Professor
Hintikka",

6

Rose makes

much of terminological issues that
have little bearing
on philosophically interesting
points. As to the nature of scientific demonstration,
he agrees with Matthews that the major and middle terms
must be co-extensive, and not nested, as Hintikka
suggests.
But
Rose further proposes that we reject
Hintikka' s account of the priority of ontological
assumptions in a

science.

On Hintikka'

s

account, what one assumes in

doing zoology, for example, is the existence
of animals,
the genus with which zoology is concerned.

By demon-

strating that various species fall under the genus
Animal, one at the same time proves the existence
of those

species
Rose objects to this characterization.

In his view,

what is assumed is the existence of the minor term, or
species, and the existence of the major term, or genus,
is proved.

Thus, instead of assuming the existence of

animals and proving the existence of dogs, we assume the

existence of dogs and prove the existence of animals.

6.

Rose, Lynn,

"Reply to Professor Hintikka", unpublished
manuscript.
Read at the Western Division Meeting of
the American Philosophical Association, 1972.
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No doubt, when viewed in isolation
from all of the
extant works of Aristotle, Rose’s
proposal is intuitively
more appealing than Hintikka's.
if we are looking for a

methodology of investigation, we would
probably do well
to prefer Rose's suggestion to
Hintikka's.

if we wanted

to establish the existence of
sub-atomic particles, we
would be ill-advised to assume the
existence of sub-atomic

particles and attempt to prove the
existence of mu-ons
sy llogis tically
Rather, one would naturally start
.

by

looking for mu-ons, or sub-atomic particles
of some other
sort, and, having found them, feel
justified in affirming
the existence of sub-atomic particles.
But, since our concern is a characterization
of Ari-

stotelian science and explanation, presumably
we do not
want to ignore what Aristotle said. In the Posterior

A nalytics enumeration of the elements of

a science,

quoted on page 24, Aristotle states quite clearly that
it is the subject genus which is posited and that,
though

their meaning is assumed, the existence of the attributes
is not.

Moreover, the genus is prior to the species,

since "Some things are called prior and posterior in this
sense, others

(4)

in respect of nature and substance, i.e.

those which can be without other things, while other

things can not be without them...",
1091al7).

(Metaphysics N,

A genus can exist independently of any one of

40

its species, but no species
can exist without its genus.
Finally, the genus is more
fundamental than the species:
"... but if we know each
thing by its definition, and
the genera are the principles
or starting points of

definitions, the genera must also
be the principles of
definable things. And if to get
knowledge

of the spe-

cies according to which things are
named is to get knowledge of the things, the genera are
at least the starting points of the species/'
Metaphysics B, 998bl5).
We cannot have knowledge of dogs
sufficient to prove
the existence of animals without
having knowledge of the
genus itself.
(

Rose's proposal does seem to be supported
by the
Physics which opens
,

When the objects of an inquiry, in any
department, have principles, conditions, or
elements, it is through acquaintance with
these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained.
For we do not
think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or
first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in
other branches of study, our first task is
to determine what relates to its principles.
The natural way of doing this is to start
from the things which are more knowable and
obvious to us and proceed towards those which
are clearer and more knowable by nature;
for the same things are not 'knowable rela-
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tiveiy to us and 'knowable'
without qualification.
So
the present inquiry we
must follow this method and
advance from
what is more obscure by nature,
er to us towards what is more but clearclear and
more knowable by nature.
(Phys. , 184a9 ff

m

,

It seems plausible to suppose
that what we are most

familiar with are the various species,
and that we become aware of superordinate species
and genera only

through analysis and comparison of these
species. We
are familiar with dogs and cats and
men, and by analysing or defining these species we become
aware of common attributes which enable us to group them
under more
general headings, such as mammal, vertebrate,
and animal.

If the syllogism were the means by which we
accomp-

lished this analysis and classification, then Rose's

account of the priority of ontological assumptions might
be preferable to Hintikka's.

But is the syllogism a methodological tool for science?

Do scientists employ the syllogism directly in

carrying out their investigations?

We must distinguish

the actual investigation involved in science from the

setting out or presentation of the results of that in-

vestigation, just as we distinguish a lab report from
the actual experiment carried out.

Is the syllogism a

tool of investigation, or a tool of presentation?
it both, or neither?

Is
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Following a suggestion made by
W. D. Ross, 7 Jonathan Barnes has argued
persuasively that Aristotle had
no intention of providing a
scientific methodology in
P osterior A nalytics
in Barnes' opinion, Aristotle's primary concern in the
Posterior Analytics
.

is

the proper method for teaching
a science, not the proper
method for carrying out investigations.
One must teach
a science in a way that will
make clear the various

necessary connections and causes
which explain the phenomena which the science has investigated.
And this is
precisely what the scientific syllogism
does.

This is not to say that demonstration
plays no normative role in science. A given proposition,
discovered
by whatever method, will be admissible
as a truth of the

science only if it can be placed in some
syllogistic
chain appropriate to the science.

This is not unlike

the procedure that has always dominated
mathematics:
the truth of major theorems is often perceived
by intui-

tion, but the theorem is admissible only after a
proof

has been given.

The syllogism plays a role in Aristo-

telian scientific investigation as a standard for evalu-

7.

Ross, W. D.
19 49.

8.

Aristotle
Page 32.

,

Barnes and Noble, New York,

Barnes, Jonathan.
"Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration", Phronesis vol. XIV, 1969.
Pages 123 - 52.
,
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ating the results of investigation,
not as a tool for
carrying out investigation.
If this is correct, and

I

think that it is, then

Rose's proposal is not nearly so
attractive.

in scien-

tific investigation, one proceeds
from the naturally
obscure to the naturally clear,
perhaps from species to
genus.
But this investigatory stage of
the science is
not demonstrative at all - we do
not proceed from species to genus by constructing
syllogisms, but do so
through empirical investigation and
the like.
Demonstration plays a role in setting out
the results of in-

vestigation.

Having discovered the principles of
the

science, that which was obscure to us,
the task is to
demonstrate or exhibit the dependence of the
phenomena

investigated, that which was clear to us but
naturally
obscure, on those principles.

It is of the very nature

of a principle to explain other things,
while remaining

unexplained itself.
dependence

:

Yet the Rose account reverses this

he would have us answer the question "Why

do animals exist?" with "Because dogs do".

tainly misguided.

This is cer-

The correct order of dependence would

involve answering the question "Why do dogs exist?" with
"Because they are animals, and animals exist".

This sort

of dependence is accurately reflected by Hintikka in as-
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suming the existence of the
genus
istence of the species.

and proving the ex-

One final point ought to
be made.

Rose suggests

that Hintikka's interpretation
commits Aristotle to the
existence of unicorns, whereas
his own account does not
He asks us to consider the
following arguments:
R:

(1)
_(2)

(3)

Dogs exist
Dogs a re animals
Animals exist

H:

(4)
(5)

Animals exist
Dogs a re animals

(6)

Dogs exist

R is evidently valid and,
since its premisses are true,
it proves the existence of
animals.
H apparently pre-

sents problems for Rose, though
he does not say precisely what those problems are.
Instead, he asks us to
consider H'
3

H

:

(4

'
1

_(5

)

(6')

If

Hmtikka accepts

Animals exist
Unicorn s are animals
Unicorns exist

H as a proof of the existence of
dogs.

Rose argues, he must also accept H

'

as a proof of the

existence of unicorns.
Hintikka does want the existence of species to follow from the existence of their genus, and so presumably
he does want to accept something like H as a proof of
the

existence of a species.

But if H is to be a syllogism
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thS firSt figure ' a scientific
syllogism, then (4)
must be universally quantified:
it must be understood
as "All animals exist".
if H
is to be of the same
111

'

form as H,

(4')

m

exist".

must also be understood as
"All animals

that case, Hintikka can block
H

pointing out that either
rejecting

(4')

(4’)

or

(S')

'

simply by

is false,

would undermine H as well as

H'

,

since
it is

safe to assume that Hintikka
would reject (5').
But what, in an Aristotelian
context, could be
more natural than rejecting (5')?
For Aristotle, being
and being something or other are
intimately connected.
Unicorns do not fall under the genus
Animal because if
they did, the essence of animality
would be included
the essence of unicorns.
But unicorns have no essence at all, because they do not exist.
So (5') may
b« rejected.

m

What

I

hope to have established is what

I

shall

call the ontological primacy of the subject-genus
of
science.

a

It is the view that what is ontologically es-

sential to a science is the genus with which the science
deals.

Any justification of the ontological foundations

of a science requires an account of the existence of the

genus whose essential attributes that science investi-
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gates.

The over-riding importance
of the existence of
the genus of a science
derives from two considerations:
first it is knowledge of the
essential nature if the
genus which is the end of the
science, and we cannot
know the essential nature of
what does not exist;
second, the existence of the
species whose essential
natures the science also investigates
is guaranteed by
the existence of the genus
under which they fall.
,

Though other important questions
will certainly
arise, my central concern in the
following chapters will
be to answer the two questions:

"With what genus is

each of the mathematical sciences
concerned?" and "What
account, consistent with Aristotle's
metaphysical views,
can be given of the existence of those
genera?" I
should emphasize that this task is in the
realm of metamathematics: each science assumes the existence
of its

subject genus, and no science is required to
offer an

account of, or prove, that existence.
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CHAPTER

III

THE GENUS OF ARITHMETIC

have argued, in chapter two, that the
primary ontological presupposition of a science is
that the genus
whose essential attributes that science
investigates
I

exists, and that, if one is concerned to
justify or legit
imize a science in terms of its ontological
foundations,
it is the existence of the genus for
which an account

must be given.

This account lies outside of the science

itself, since the existence of the genus is
assumed by
the science.

The existence of the species falling under

the genus, on the other hand, is demonstrated
within the

science.

What, then, is the genus with which Arithmetic

is concerned?

Several passages in the Posterior Analytics suggest
that Unity is the genus whose existence Arithmetic assumes

:

Also peculiar to the science are the subjects
the existence as well as the meaning of which
it assumes, and the essential attributes of
which it investigates, for example, in arithmetic, units, in geometry points and lines.
Post An.
76b4 - 7)
(

.

,

Hence it is evident that there are essential
natures which are immediate, that is, are
basic premisses;
and of these not only that
they are but also what they are must be assumed or revealed in some other way [other
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than by demonstration]. This too
is the actual procedure of the arithmetician,
who assumes both the nature and existence
of unit.
(Post. _An

Previously,

8

.

,

9

3b21

-

25)

we saw that the genus was the
"start-

ing point" for knowledge of the species,
and in the Meta

physics we find:
Measure is that by which quantity is known,
and
quantity qua quantity is known by unity or by
number, and all number is known by unity.
Therefore all quantity qua quantity is known by
unity;
and that by which quantities are primarily known is absolute unity. Thus unity is
the starting point of number qua number.
Met I 7 1052b20 - 24)
(

.

If Unity is the genus of Arithmetic, giving an
ac-

count of the existence of that genus seems to offer no

difficulties.

All substances are unities.

The genus

Unity exists, because substances exist, and all substance
unities

.

Thus, there is no problem in providing an

ontological foundation for Arithmetic, if Unity is its
genus

There are a number of considerations, however, which

preclude taking Unity as the genus of Arithmetic.

First

of all, in Metaphysics G, we are told that the discovery
of the essential attributes of Being qua Being and of

Unity qua Unity belong to First Philosophy, that is, to
8

.

See chapter II, page

40.
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Metaphysics.

if unity were the genus of
Arithmetic,

Arithmetic would be First Philosophy,
or some branch of
it.
Yet First Philosophy is contrasted
with the particu
lar sciences, and among them
the mathematical sciences,
in Metaphysics G

9
.

Further and more serious difficulties
arise from the
very close connection between Unity
and Being emphasized
in Metaphysics G and I.
In Metaphysics A, Aristotle argues that there can be no unified science
of Being because
'being'

is homonymous:

different categories.
nects

'is'

has different senses in the

In Metaphysics I, Aristotle con-

'being' with 'unity'

That in a sense unity means the same as being
is clear from the facts that its meanings
correspond to the categories one to one, and
it is not comprised within any category (e.g.
it is comprised neither in 'what a thing is'
nor in quality, but is related to them just
as being is)
that in 'one man' nothing more
is predicated than in 'man' (just as being
is
nothing apart from substance or quality or
quantity);
and that to be one is just to be
a particular thing.
Met I, 1054al3 - IS)
;

(

.

If no unified science of Being is possible because
of

homonymy, and if 'unity', like 'being', has different uses
in the different categories, then it would seem that Arith-

9.

Met. G, 100 3a20

-

b30.
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metic is not possible as a
unified science
is Unity.

if its genus

In "Logic and Metaphysics in
Some Earlier Works of

Aristotle", 10 G. E.

L.

Owen maintains that, in Metaphys-

ics G, Aristotle is retreating
from his claim that 'is'
is homonymous.
A unified science of Being,
Metaphysics

or First Philosophy, is possible,
Owen argues, because
'is' is not strictly homonymous.
There are a number of
senses of 'is', but there is one
primary sense which is

incorporated into the other senses.

That is, all of the

definitions of the various senses of
'is' make reference
to the primary sense of 'is'.
This dependency of senses
on one primary sense Owen calls
"focal analysis".

Metaphysics
of

'

one

'

I

suggests that there is a primary sense

or 'unity', which functions for unity
in much

the way that the primary sense of 'is'
functions for being.

That is, all of the various senses of 'one' or
'unity'

depend in some way upon the primary sense of the
term in
question.

If Owen is right, and Aristotle's distinction

between primary and secondary senses of

'is'

provides us

with a unified science of Being, perhaps the same distinction will, when applied to 'unity', provide us with a
unified science of Arithmetic.
10.

Owen, G. E. L. "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier
Works of Aristotle". Aristotle and Plato in the MidFourth Century section VII.
,
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But there is a problem with
Owen's proposal.
In
M e ta physics A, Aristotle argues
that, if there is to be
a single science of Being,
'is' must be univocal in
all
of its uses.
But 'is' is not univocal, it
is homonymous,
and so no science of Being is
possible.
Owen's focal
analysis may indeed enable Aristotle
to circumvent this
argument against the possibility of
a unified science of
Being, but there is another objection
to such a science
which focal analysis does nothing to
mitigate.
In the Posterior Analytics

Aristotle includes as

,

one of the three elements of a science a
subject genus
whose essential attributes the science
investigates:

A single science is one whose domain is a
genus, viz. all the subjects constituted out of the primary entities of the
genus - i.e. the parts of this total subject - and their essential properties.
11
Post An
87a38 - 39)
.

(

.

,

This characterization is carried over into the
Metaphysics

Therefore to investigate the essential attributes of one class of things starting from
one set of beliefs, is the business of one
science
Met B, 997a23 - 4)
,

(

Yet in the Metaphysics

,

Aristotle repeatedly asserts that

neither Being nor Unity is
11.

See also Post

12

Met

•

.

,

.

An.,

.

a genus.

12

76bl2.

998b21, 1040al6

,

1053bl2.

Being and Unity
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thus seem to be precluded as
genera for any single science, whether or not the problem
of homonymy can be surmounted by appeal to focal analysis.
It should be pointed out that
focal analysis does

not itself mitigate the claim that
Being and Unity are
not genera.
Even if one could argue that focal
analysis
might enable us to include Being and
Unity as genera, it
is quite clear that Aristotle did
not think that the dependence of secondary senses on primary
could be used in
this way.
For, in Metaphysics I, in close
proximity
with his discussion of the senses of
'unity', Aristotle
reiterates his claim that neither Being nor
Unity is a

genus
Therefore, on the one hand, genera are not
certain entities and substances separable
from other things
and on the other hand
the one cannot be a genus, for the same
reasons for which being and substance cannot
be genera.
Met I, 105 3b20 - 23)
;

(

.

Thus, whatever advantages accrue from the intro-

duction of focal analysis, it is clear that focal analysis
does not entitle us to construe Being as a single genus.

Since Being is not a genus, the investigation of Being qua

Being lacks one of the three elements which, in the Posteriory Analytics

,

go to make up any science.

First Philosophy is a pseudo-science,

a

At best,

study which bears

a strong resemblance to science but is not,

strictly
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speaking, a science.

And the same will hold
true for

Arithmetic, if it is the study
of Unity.
It seems that we are left
with the following dilemma: either we accept the
Posterior

Analytics account

of science and construe First
Philosophy as some sort of
deficient analogue to science, or
we accept the claim of
aphySiCS G that First Philosophy
is a unified science,
and abandon the Posterior
Analytics account of science.
The same dilemma presents itself
for Arithmetic, if „ e
take it to be the study of Unity.

—

'

Whatever we may decide in the case of
First Philosophy,
i think it is ill-advised
to allow this dilemma
to arise at all in the case of
Arithmetic.
First, as

noted earlier, whichever horn of the
dilemma we adopt, Arithmetic, when construed as the study of
Unity, becomes either identical with First Philosophy,
(if we read "unity
is the same as being" as strongly
as possible), or a sub-

ordinate branch of First Philosophy, and this
conflicts
with the contrast drawn between First Philosophy

and the

mathematical sciences in Metaphysics

G.

in fact, G im-

plicitly excludes the study of number from First Philosophy:

13.

t seems to me that the first alternative is preferable, but a lengthy consideration of this point is not
germane to the present work.
-l
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us since these are the
essential modifications of Unity qua Unity and
2U| B eing and not qua numbers of Being
or lines or
rire it is clear that it
belongs to this
[Flrst Phi l° s ophy to investigate
botWh
both the essence of these
concepts and
their properties.
(Met. G, 1004b5 - 7)
f

'

]

Second, Aristotle takes Arithmetic
to be a paradigm of
his Posterior Analytics account
of science, and it is

difficult to believe that, in

a single work,

Aristotle
would set out the elements of a
demonstrative science
and offer as an example of such a
science a study which
lacked one of those elements.
We can avoid the dilemma entirely
in the case of

Arithmetic simply by finding an alternative
to Unity as
the genus xor Arithmetic.
One candidate which immediately presents itself is Plurality: numbers
might be con
strued as species of Plurality.
One serious objection to taking Unity as
the genus of Arithmetic may not apply to Plurality.

Unity is

not a genus, as Aristotle consistently maintains,
and so
it can not function as a subject genus for any
Aristoteli-

an science.

At least part of Aristotle's motivation for

denying that Unity is a genus appears to be that 'unity'
is predicable of anything and everything which exists.

Obviously, anything which is,

is_,

and similarly, anything

which is is a something or other, a unity of some sort or
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other.

So neither Being nor Unity
is a genus,

1054al0 ff).

(of.

take it that the idea here
is something
like this:
to say that a thing is
a member of a genus
is to classify that thing
as a thing of a certain
kind.
To classify a thing as a
thing of a certain kind is
to
distinguish it from things not of
that kind,
since
'being' and 'unity' are
predicable, in some way or other,
of anything whatever, saying
that something has being,
or that it is a unity, is not
to classify it at all, because such claims do not distinguish
the thing in question from anything else. Thus,
there seems to be the
i

presupposition that a necessary condition
for
F, to pick out or name a
genus, is that

a

predicate

there should be

something, x, such that

'

x is F'

is not true.

Now one might be tempted to argue as
follows:
plurality is the privation of unity.
Since 'unity' is

predicable of everything,
nothing.

'plurality' is predicable of

But a genus exists only in so far as
individuals

of that genus exist, so plurality, as a
genus, does not

exist.

Hence, plurality can not be the subject genus
of

Arithmetic
Such an argument against taking Plurality as the

subject genus of Arithmetic fails.

plurality

have many senses

-

Both 'unity' and

presumably their senses
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correspond one to one.

Now something which is in
one

sense a unity may, in another
sense, be a plurality,
a
man, for example, gua man, is
a unity, because he is
an
individual of his species. But a
man qua extended
is a

Plurality, because he is infinitely
divisible.
Now I
think that Aristotle's position
is that, for anything
whatever, some sense of 'unity' is
predicable
of it.

sim-

ilarly, for most things, there is
some sense of 'plurality'
predicable of them.
But there are things, geometric
points
for example, which are in no sense
pluralities. Thus, it
is not the case that nothing is
a plurality, nor is it the
case that everything is a plurality.
It seems to be open
to Aristotle, then, to allow that
Plurality is legitimately a genus, and in distinguishing
Plurality and Magnitude as kinds falling under the category
of Quantity,
he seems to be doing precisely this,
(cf. Me^. D
1020a5f)
,

But other problems do arise if we take
Plurality to
be the genus of Arithmetic.

Plurality is said to be the

"opposite" of Unity, or the privation of Unity, and,
as
such, it is included in the subject matter of First
Philo-

sophy

:

Now since it is the work of one science to
investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed
to unity - and it belongs to one science to investigate the negation and the privation because in both cases we are really investigating
the one thing of which the negation or the privation is a negation or privation... [the study
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(Met.

Thus,

G,

1004a9

-

19

)

the problems which arose
as a result of subsuming

Arithmetic under First Philosophy
arise again if Plurality is taken as the
genus of Arithmetic.
Another problem which arises
for an interpretation
taking Plurality as the
genus of Arithmetic stems
from
the fact that not every
plurality
is a number.

We shall
see later that a plurality
must satisfy certain conditions in order to be measurable,
and only those pluralities which are measured will
count as numbers.
But Arithmetic seems to be concerned
exclusively with numbers,
their properties and relations
with one another. If this
is so,

the", if

Plurality were the genus of
Arithmetic,
Arithmetic would be seriously deficient
as
a science,

for

it would investigate only a
part of its subject genus.

Plurality in general, then, will not
do as the genus for
Arithmetic
At one point in the Posterior Analytics

explicitly mentions

a

,

Aristotle

subject-genus for Arithmetic:

For fundamental truths are of two kinds,
those
which are premisses of demonstration and the
subject genus;
and though the former are com-

14.

See also Met.

I,

1054a20.
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m °n, the latter
number, for instance,
and
magnitude - are peculiar.
(Post. An.

,

88bl8 ff

In the passages previously
considered, 15 Unity was suggested as the subject genus
of Arithmetic.
The suggestion arises because one of
the elements of a science
is
the subject genus, the meaning
and existence of which is
assumed.
The passages cited marked
units as that whose

existence Arithmetic assumes, and
it was quite natural
to infer that Unity is the
subject genus

of Arithmetic.

Now we have the statement that
Number is the subject
genus of Arithmetic, and Number,
whatever it may be, can
not be identified with Unity. 16
How do we reconcile
these apparently opposed strains
of the Posterior Analytics?

Aristotle characterizes number variously as
"a plur
a-Lty of units" (1053a23)
"a measured plurality and
a

,

plurality of measures"

(1088a5), and "of more units than

one, and specifically of "so many""

(207bl2)

.

This sug-

gests that, taking Number as the subject-genus
of Arith15.
16.

See chapterlll, pages 47

-

48.

At 207bl2 for example, a contrast is drawn between
unit and number by pointing out that the unit is atomic, while number is non-atomic.
,
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metic

the ’fundamental truth" or
first premiss of

,

that science will be something
to the effect that "Number is a plurality of units".
Both the existence and
meaning of Number will be assumed
by Arithmetic.
Clearly
if Number is assumed to exist,
and if the essence,
or an essential attribute, of
Number is that it is a
/

plurality of units, then units are also
assumed to exist.
There cannot be a plurality of units
if

there are

no units.

We need not infer from this that
Unity, not

Number, is the genus of Arithmetic any
more than we need
infer from the fact that all animals are
physical objects that Physical Object, not Animal, is
the genus of
Zoology.

I

think that the passages cited on the first

page of this chapter can be understood in this
light,
and that, so understood, they present no difficulty
for
the view that Number is the subject-genus of
Arithmetic.

Briefly,

Arithmetic

I

,

suggest that Number is the subject-genus
that the species of Number are the various

natural numbers, and that the individuals of those species are individual properties of groups or collections
of things.

am not using the term 'property' with the narrow

I

technical sense that Aristotle gives it in Topics A.

Rather

,

I

5.

am using it in a very broad way that is cate-
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gory-promiscuous:

there are quantitative,
qualitative,
relational, temporal, etc.,
properties. The properties
with which Arithmetic deals will
fall under the category of Quantity, and in particular,
under the genus
Measured Plurality, or Number.

There is some controversy which
arises in interpreting Aristotle on the point of
individuation of properties.
The discussion of the various
interpretations is commonly
terms of the individuation of
qualities, but the points
considered seem to me to be applicable to
the other categories as well. Quantity among them.
in the course of my
discussion of number, I will argue that
Aristotle maintains that there are species of number,
and that the in-

m

dividuals of those species are the numbers
of particular
groups or collections. For example, Ten is
a species of

Number, two individuals of which are my ten
fingers, and

my wife

s

ten fingers.

The implications of this inter-

pretation of Aristotle on number for the dispute over
the
individuation of qualities is properly

a

topic for another

work
One noteworthy critic of the view that numbers are

properties of external objects or of collections of external objects is Gottlob Frege.

He says:
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And it is quite true that, while
I am
P° sltlon simply by thinking of
it differently, to alter the
colour
hardness of a thing in the slightest,or
I
am able to think of the Iliad
either as one
r dS 24 books
or as som e large numLTAf°
ber
of verses... Nor can we say
in this
case that the different numbers
exist in
the same thing side by side, as
different
colours do.
I can point to the
patch of
each individual colour without saying
a
word, but I cannot in the same way
point
to the individual numbers.
if i can call
the same object red and green with
equal
right, it is a sure sign that the
object
named is not what really has the
green
colour;
for that we must first get a surface which is green only.
Similarly, an
object to which I can ascribe different
numbers with equal right is not what
really
has a number
17
...

'

'

.

Apparently

,

Frege is making some appeal to the law

of non-contradiction here.

Red and green are usually

considered to be contraries, and so both can not
be
truly predicated of a single thing at a single

time.

That which is properly said to be red can not at
che
rime time be green.

When something is described as be-

ing both red and green, what is meant is that parts
of
it are red and other parts are green.
er11?

•

Properly speak-

only parts of thing are red, and those parts are

not green, and vice versa.

Frege argues that the same line of reasoning ap-

plies to numerical properties:

17.

Frege, Gottlob.

a collection which is

The Foundations of Arithmetic, §22.
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six can not be seven.

For the argument to go through,

we must suppose that numerical
properties are contraries
of one another;
that, for example, six is a
contrary of
seven.
Let us grant this point.

Now consider a heap of one hundred
grey stones.
One cannot, simply by thinking about
the heap in a different way, alter the color of the heap.
The heap is
grey, and no amount of cogitation will
change it to
green.

On the other hand, when

I

think of the heap as

heap of stones, it is a heap of one hundred,
whereas
when I think of it as a heap of molecules,
it is a heap
a

of trillions.

The very same heap seems to have the

quite distinct numerical properties one hundred
and
trillions

.

This shows, according to Frege, that the

heap cannot properly be said to have either
property,
for we can no more say that a single thing has
distinct

numerical properties than we can say that a single
thing
has two different colors.

From Aristotle's point of view, the mistake in
Frege

s

reasoning lies in his supposition that the only

distinction between the collection of stones and the
collection of molecules is the way in which an observer
chooses to regard the heap.

The collection of stones is

one thing, and it has the property one hundred.

The col-
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lection of molecules is quite another
thing, and it has
the property trillions.
It is indeed true that the collection of stones also has the property
being made up of
--

llllQns

—

-?. lecu les

,

but this is not a number;

and

the collection of molecules has the
property making

one hundred stones

up_

but this is not a number either.

,

And it is not true either that the collection
of stones
has the property trillions

,

or that the collection of

molecules has the property one hundred.
it might be urged, the heap of stones is the

/

very same heap as the heap of molecules
one heap there.

-

there is only

Thus, if the heap of stones has the

prope-ty one hundred

,

the heap of molecules has that

property as well.
In both the Physics

(1017bl5 ff

i££,

)

,

(202bl0 ff

)

and the Metaphys -

Aristotle distinguishes between rela-

,

tions of sameness which are apparently of differing
strengths.

Things are the same properly speaking, or

in the strongest sense, when their substance
is one.
1

This strict sense of sameness,

)

H-aP

irt'ov^

'

<*cVLO)

,

appears to be, at least roughly, our ordinary no-

tion of identity.
a s/#/3&/ar)Xo5

But there is a weaker sense,

J

)

,

/

(

£*c\rtov

/

in which things may be said to be

the same though their substance or being

(Vo

)

is
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not one.

'WtiV

X*V2

K/r

may be translated

'

as "accidental sameness".

Anthony Willing proposes that the
condition, that x
and y are strictly or properly the
same only

if their sub-

stance is one, may be understood as
x is the same as to be 1
y
as y1

rx is

is true just in case

x is the same as to be y1

is true, but 'to be

is not true.

and rFx

1

only if rx is y

= y only if to be

accidentally the same

rx is -1
y

that an inference from rx is
y
1

'x

means rx = y

Willing argues
to

r

Fy1

is valid

1
.

Now the collection of molecules is accidentally
the
same as the collection of stones, but not
identical with
it, because to be the collection of molecules
in question
is not the same as to be the collection of
stones.

molecules as
ley

i

a

The

matter of fact make up the stones, but

need not have.

The very same collection of mole-

l

cules might have made up a single boulder, or they might
have made up nothing else at all.
If Willing is correct,

then, we can not infer from

the fact that the heap of molecules is the heap of stones

and the heap of molecules is trillions, that the heap of

18.

Willing, Anthony. Aristotle on the Paradoxes of
Accidence particularly pages 101 - 104
,
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stones is trillions, because the
heap of molecules and
the heap of stones are not identical.

Aristotle's answer to Frege, then, is
that the heap,

m

so far as it is a heap of stones,
is one hundred, and
in so far as it is a heap of molecules,
is trillions, but
that the heap qua heap of stones is not
identical with
the heap qua heap of molecules.
The collection of stones
is one hundred,

the collection of molecules is trillions.

Nor, as Frege seems to suggest, does it
follow from the

fact that the answer we get in counting the
things in
the heap depends upon what we take it to be
a heap of,

that the numbers are not really properties of
the collections.

The stones are there whether anyone ever takes

them to be stones or not, and similarly for the
molecules;

and there are one hundred stones there and tril-

lions of molecules, whether anyone ever counts them or
not.

So far

I

have presented an interpretation of Ari-

stotle which takes numbers to be properties of collections,
and considered an objection to such a view raised by

Frege.

I

want now to consider a problem that arises when

we consider the individuation of collections, which, on
the interpretation of Aristotle being presented, will also
be the individuation of particular numbers.
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We have supposed that an individual number is a

quantitative property of a particular collection of
things of some sort.

The collection will be the col-

lection it is, and hence have the particular numerical

property it has, in virtue of the particular things in
the collection.
of ton stones

,

Starting with a particular collection
if

ft with another,

remove one of the stones and replace

I

X

have a different collection of stones,

hence a different individual ten.
Now let us consider some particular collection of
four stones.

Surely we want to say that there are two

two's in that four:

this would seem to mean that there

are two sub-collections of that four-collection each of

which hag, a property of being two.

But, if we consider

the case, we seem to find that there are not merely two

two's in that four, but six distinct particular two's.
Let the stones be a, b, c, and d. Then the collections
(a,b)

,

(b,c)

,

(c,d)

,

etc., each are two.

Modern Nominalists deal with this sort of problem
by employing a notion of "overlapping". 19
a,

19.

An individual,

is said to overlap an individual, b, provided a and b

See Rolph A. Eberle's Nominalistic Systems
larly pages 44 - 50.

,

particu-
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have some part in common.

If the number four is
identi-

fied with the collection <a,b,c,d)
itself, then that
collection can properly be said to
have
(a,b)

as parts, or

(a,c)

and

(c,d)

and (b,d) as parts, but it
cannot

properly be said to have (a,b) and
(b,c) as parts, because these individuals overlap. A
complex, or non-

atomic, individual,

c,

is properly said to have a
and b

as parts only if a and b do
not overlap.

The claim

that there are two two's in four in
this case amounts
to the claim that there are two parts
of any particular
four each of which itself has two
parts.

It is incorrect

to say that there are six two's in
four, because there
are not six non-overlapping parts of
four each of which

has two parts.

But what is Aristotle's solution to this difficulty?
He nowhere explicitly considers the problem,
though he

discusses a similar objection to

tonism in Metaphysics M.
in Metaphysics

Z,

a

certain form of Pla-

A solution is suggested, however,

where Aristotle says:

A Substance cannot consist of substances
present in it in complete reality; for
things that are thus in complete reality
two are never in complete reality one,
though if they are potentially two, they
can be one... It is clear therefore that
the same will hold good of number, if
number is a synthesis of units, as is
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said by some;
for two is either not one,
or there is no unit present
in it in complete reality.
Z,

10 39a3 ff)

What Aristotle would say about
the competing claims,
"there are two two's in four”
and "there are six two's
four", is that both are false,
if what is meant is
that there are two or six actual
two's

m

in four, re-

spectively.

There are no actual sub-collections
of the
particular four-collection we are
considering which

have the property of being two,
because what is actually
many, (actually made up of
sub-collections), can not be
actually one, (actually a single collection
with a numerical property).
If four is to exist
at all, it

must be a four, the property of
lection.

a single

unified col-

But if there are actually sub-collections
of

that collection, then that collection will
lack unity,
and have no properties at all.
Thus, if the claims in

question are to be consistent with the existence
of
four, they must be understood as claims about
potentiality*

there are potentially two two's in four, or there

are potentially six two's in four.
To say that there are m n's in

j

is just to say

that a collection which has the property
vided,

can be di-

j

(though it is not actually divided)

,

into m col-
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lections each of which has the
property of being an n.
To say that there are two
two's in four is to say that
one can perform a division
on a given four-collection
and produce two actual
sub-collections each of which
is two
and this is true.
To say that there are six
two's in four, on the other hand,
is to say that one
can divide a given four-collection
and produce six subcollections each of which has the
property of being
two.
This is not true.
For suppose two of the actual
sub-collections produced by the division
,

are

(b,c):

tions

,

(a,b)

and

there are two one's in each of these
two-collec-

but again, the one's are present only
potentially.

How can these two two's be produced by

original four-collection?

(a,b)

.

division of the

start with (a,b,c,d), which

I

has the property of being four.

collection,

a

I

segregate one two-

But now b is no longer available to

be included in another two.

I

can't separate the b from

(a,b), because it is not present as an actual
one to be

segregated.

It is present as an individual in

only potentially, and if

pull it out of

I

der to include it in (b,c)

,

I

(a,b)

(a,b)

in or-

destroy the original two,

(a,b)

The illusion that one can produce six actual two's

from a particular four-collection arises because it is
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obvious that, given any four discreet
elements,

associate them by two's in six different ways.
this is not at all what is happening
when
I

I

can

But

divide an

actual four-collection into sub-collections
each of
which is two, because I am not starting with

four ac-

tual individuals and combining them in
various ways,

but rather starting with one thing, a
four-collection,
and dividing it one way or another.

The fact is that,

given a particular collection which is four, there
are
three different ways in which it can be divided
into

collections which are two's, but each way produces only
two two's.

Moreover, the three ways that this can be

done are mutually exclusive
be actualized at a time.

—

only one of the three can

In order to be able to pro-

duce six two's by dividing four,

(hence, in order to

make it true that there are six two's in four), one would
have to be able to actualize all three of the possible

ways of dividing the four-collection simultaneously,
but this can not be done.
Thus, Aristotle can agree to the truth of the claim

that there are two two's in four, and deny that there are

six two's in four, given a correct understanding of those

claims in terms of what is potentially present in

collection

.

a

four-
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The intimate connection between
a number and the
kind of thing numbered is emphasized
in Metaphysics I

(particularly, 1052bl4

-

1053a30)

.

f

This intimacy pro-

duces some interesting consequences
for Arithmetic.
It has already been noted that
not any collection is
numbered, for number is not simply
plurality, but measured plurality.
The qualification "measured" excludes
those pluralities - collections - which
are such that
the individuals making up the plurality
do not all fall

under some single genus.

A plurality is a measured

plurality only if there is a measure which
measures it;
that is, a single principle of individuation
which can
be applied to everything in the plurality.

Some examples may be helpful.
of horses and cows:

Consider a collection

this collection is no number of

horses and no number of cows, because the principle of

individuation for horses will not apply to everything in
the collection.

When we have picked out all of the in-

dividual horses in the collection, we will have things
left over which are in the collection but which have not

yet been picked out or individuated
measure,

"a horse",

counted.

The

does not succeed in measuring the

plurality in question.
the measure "a cow".

-

Obviously, the same applies to

Nonetheless, the collection is
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numbered, though it is not a number
of horses or a number of cows or, for that matter,
a number of horses and
cows.

It is a number of animals, a
number of vertebrates
a number of mammals.
Each of these measures, "an
animal"
"a vertebrate",

"a mammal",

does provide a principle of

individuation which, when applied to
the members of the
collection, exhausts the collection.
Each of
these

measures succeeds in measuring the
plurality in question.
But consider now a collection of
goats and colors.
This collection will be neither a
number of goats nor a
number of colors.
In fact, this collection will not
be
numbered at all, because the individuals
in the collection fall into different categories.
There will be no
genus into which all of the individuals in
the collection fall, hence there will be no measure
which measures
the plurality in question.

Implicit in this, of course,

is the assumption that we cannot manufacture
kind-terms

to serve as measures 19

For example, we cannot measure

the collection of colors and goats with the
measure "a

goat or a color".

Presumably, this is because "a goat

or a color" does not pick out any single natural kind,
a species or a genus

19

.

See note, page 78.
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The view that not every plurality
is numbered com-

mits Aristotle to placing
restrictions on certain gener
al statements in Arithmetic.
The claim that two plus
three equals five cannot be taken
to be completely general:
it cannot mean, "given any
individual two-collection and any individual three-collection,
if the
two

are combined or united, the
result is an individual
five-collection'.'

The reason for this should be
obvious

from the foregoing discussion.

If the three in question

is a property of a collection
of goats, and the two in

question is

a

property of a collection of colors,
the

collection produced by combining or uniting
the two will
not be numbered at all, because it will
not be a meas-

ured plurality.
In general Arithmetical claims,

number terms are elliptical.
is to be understood as

then, it seems that

'2+3=5'

The statement

'2f's + 3f's = 5f's'.

Only those

numbers which are properties of collections having

common measure can be added.

Multiplication can be un-

derstood as simply repeated addition.
not interpret

'3x2=6'

rather as '2f's

as

a

That is, we need

'3f's x 2f's = 6f's', but

+ 2f's + 2f's = 6f's'.

The '3' in the

original expression is elliptical, but not elliptical
for

'

3f s
'

'

Rather, it is elliptical for

'

3

(

2

f
'

s

'

,

that is, it is a number of numbers, telling us how many
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2f s are to be added together.

We can now go some way toward
understanding the
doctrine of Metaphysics I that number
terms have many
uses, that they are said in many
ways.
'Two' is elliptical for 'two horses' when used to
refer to or describe
a certain collection, and elliptical
for

'two cows' when

used to refer to or describe a
different collection.
in
the one case, 'two' is being used as
short-hand for 'two
horses', in the other, as short-hand for
'two cows'.

Thus,

'two'

has as many uses as there are species
and

genera which provide measures for pluralities.
This is not to

say-,

however, that number terms have

many senses, that there are distinct defining
formulae
for a number corresponding to each of its
many uses.

Metaphysics

I,

In

Aristotle lists general classes of things

which are one by their own nature, distinguishing

a num-

ber of principal ways in which 'one' is said,

4V

yt/eV
)

tinuous,

(2)

These classes are:

.

that which is

shape or form;

(3)

a

('Co

(1)

ot\

the con-

whole and has a certain

in number, the individual;

(4)

in

kind, that which in intelligibility and in knowledge is

indivisible.

Ross distinguishes four different primary

senses of 'one' corresponding to the application of 'one'
to members of each of these four classes. 20
20

.

Ross

,

W.

D.

This sug-

Aristotle's Metaphysics, vol. II, pages

~m'

-

4.
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gests that 'one' is homonymous

-

that the definition or

logos of 'one' will be different
when 'one' modifies
terms naming things from different
classes. But this
seems to me to be incorrect.
The first class of things which
are one by their
own nature is the class of continuous
things.
To say
that 'one' has a primary use corresponding
to that

class seems to claim little more than
that, in a large
number of cases where we use the term
'one', it is being
used to modify a term naming some continuous
thing.

On

the other hand, to say that 'one' has a
sense correspond-

ing

or appropriate to the class of continuous
things

suggests that there is a definition of 'one' or
'x is
one', which includes reference to continuity

or to con-

tinuous things.

For example:

individual continuous thing';

naturally continuous

'x is one'

or,

=

'x is an

'x is one'

=

df

'x is

'

Bnt this raises a serious difficulty.

For the con-

tinuous is often characterized by Aristotle as that which
is infinitely divisible,

(see Physics

,

185bl0, for example).

If we are to follow Ross and accept as a sense of

the naturally continuous",
'one'

21.

'one',

then one of the senses of

appears to be 'by nature infinitely divisible'.

Ibid, page 280.
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This is totally unacceptable,
because Aristotle emphasizes indivisibility as the salient
feature of that
which is one: at Physics 207b5,
"The reason is that
what is one (To £V
is indivisible whatever it
may be,
e.g. a man is one man, not many";
at Metaphysics D,
)

(1016bl8 ff),

"The essence of what is one is
to be some

kind of beginning of number... But
everywhere the one
is indivisible either in kind or
in quantity". 22
if,

as the P hysics suggests, what is
one, in so far as it
is one, is atomic, and if, as
Metaphysics D suggests,

indivisibility is part of the essence of being
one, it
is extremely implausible to suppose
that Aristotle

would allow a definition of 'one' which
entails infinite divisibility.
But the simple fact is that we don't have Aristotle

offering four senses or definitions of 'one' in Metaphy sics

I.

At the conclusion of his discussion of the

four primary uses of 'one', the four general classes of

things which are by their nature unities, Aristotle says
.

.

.

all these are one because in some cases the move-

ment, in others the thought or the definition is indivisible'.',

(1052a32).

It seems that here Aristotle is

pointing to one feature, indivisibility, which justifies
the application of the term 'one'
22.

See also Met

.

I,

1053b24;

to the things in the

Met. N, 1090al.
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different classes.

The difference of use arises
because
the things in one class exhibit
indivisibility in virtue of some aspect of their
nature, (e.g., continuous
things have indivisible motion)
while things in another
class exhibit indivisibility in
virtue of some other aspect, (e.g., the individuals of a
species can not be divided into parts which are individuals
of that species).
,

This view is supported by the
remainder of 1.1.
Having distinguished the four primary
classes of things

which are one, the classes of referents
of the term 'one',
Aristotle asserts that giving the meaning
of the term

one
it.

is a different project, and immediately
undertakes

He says:

But it must be observed that the questions,
what sort of things are said to be one, and
what it is to be one and what is the definition of it, should not be assumed to be the
same ... For thi s reason too
to be one
means to be indivisible, being essentially
1

,

.

,

a this and capable of being isolated either
in place, or in form, or in thought'; or
perhaps 'to be whole and indivisible'; but
it means especially 'to be the first measure
of a kind', and most strictly of quantity...
Met I, lo52bl - 19)
(

.

I think it is clear that the alternatives suggested
here

are not alternative definitions or senses of 'one', but

alternative characterizations of the single sense or logos of

'

one

'
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As

have already suggested, the
distinctions of
uses are not confined to the four
classes of things discussed at the outset of Metaphysics
I.
There
I

are as

many uses for number-terms as
there are species and
genera available as substituends for
'f' in expressions
r
like nf s*
where 'n' is a number term. Aristotle
says
that in 'one man' no more is predicated
'

f

than in 'man',

(1054al5

)

.

To call Socrates a man is to say
of Socrates

that he has a certain form, and the
fact that he has
that form entails his oneness.
Socrates is one in virtue of having the indivisible form man
Now what it is
.

to be a man is quite different from what
it is to be a

horse.

The principle of unity for a horse, its form,
is

quite different from the principle of unity for
a man.
To call Socrates one is to refer to the indivisibility
of his form, which is man;
t

>

to call Secretariat one is

refer to the indivisibility of his form, which is

i

horse

.

Thus,

ferent things:

'one'

is being used to refer to quite dif-

the indivisibility of man

,

on the one

hand, the indivisibility of horse on the other. 23

But

we need not, and should not, suppose that there is a

change of sense corresponding to the change of referent.
23.

This may explain why 'goat or color' cannot be a
measure - there is no such form, and therefore no
principle of unity corresponding to it. Indeed,
the disjunction seems to carry with it the notion
of divisibility.
(See page 72
)
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To say that a collection is
numbered is to say that
it is so-many ones.
The requirement that the
collection
have a measure is simply the
requirement that 'one' have
a single use in its application
to every member
of the

collection.

Similarly, the requirement that only
num-

bers which are properties of collections
with a common
measure can be added is simply the
requirement that 'one*
have a single use throughout expressions
like 'so-many
ones plus so-many ones equals so-many
ones'.
Thus, the

multiplicity of uses of number terms is

a

consequence of

the multiplicity of uses of 'one'.

I

have now given a rather lengthy exposition
of my

interpretation of Aristotle's account of number,
and
dealt with several problems to which it gives rise.

One

might reasonably ask, at this point, what textual
evidence is there to support the claim that Aristotle
held

anything like this view of number.
The case rests almost exclusively on Aristotle's

repeated references to the essences of numbers.

physics

D,

we find:

Quality 'means (1) the differentiae of the
essence of a thing, (2) that which is present, besides quantity, in the essence of
unchangeable (mathematical) objects, e.g.
'

In Meta-
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the 'planeness
numbers
.

or

'solidity' of composite
24

.

(Met.

D,

1020a32 ff)

And, in the Posterior Analytics

attributes are...
such that,
while they belong to certain (2)
subjects, the
subjects to which they belong are
contained
a ttnbute s own defining
formula.
Thus straight and curved belong to
line,
odd and even, square and oblong to
number... 24
(Post. An.

7

,

3a35 f f

In Metaphysics Z, Aristotle argues
that only species

have essences:

"Nothing, then, which is not a species

of a genus will have an essence

it...",

(10 30al2

-

only species will have

)

It seems clear, then, that Aristotle is
committed
to the view that numbers are species, and
in the Physics

he says as much:
It is said rightly, too, that the number
of the sheep and of the dogs is the same
number if the two numbers are equal, but
not the same decad or the same ten... For
things are called the same so-and-so if
they do not differ by a differentia of that
thing, but not if they do... Therefore the
number of two groups also is the same number (for their number does not differ by a
differentia of number), but it is not the
same decad;
for the things of which it is
asserted differ; one group are dogs, and
the other horses.
Physics 224a2 ff)
(

24.

,

"Plane" composites are products of two other numbers, "solid" composites are products of three
other numbers.
These are sometimes referred to as
squares and oblongs, respectively.
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Socrates and Pythagoras are
specifically the same, and
so are the same (kind of) animal.
There are no differentiae of the genus Animal by which
they differ.
But

nonetheless, they are not the same man,
for there is a
difference in their matter. 25 Similarly,
this ten, a

property of a group of dogs, is the same
as that ten,
property of a group of sheep, in so far

a

as the numbers

are specifically the same.

(particular)

But this ten is not the same

ten as that, because the individuals
in the

collections differ.
If

'two',

'three', etc., are names of species,
that

is, if Number is a genus of which
two, three, and the

other natural numbers are species, what are
the differentiae of those species?

What is it that makes two

specifically different from three?
The Me taphysics D passage cited above,

(page 79),

continues
For the essence of each number is that which
goes into it once;
e.g. that of 6 is not
what goes twice or thrice, but what goes
once;
for 6 is once 6. ...
^
(Met
.

.

D,

10 20b8

And in the Physics we find:

25.

It is a subject of some controversy whether substances are individuated on the basis of their
matter, but this is not of particular concern in
the present work.

82

whereas number is of more units
than
one, and specifically of
"so-many", so
that you can not go back farther
than the
indivisible (for 'two' and 'three',
that
is two ones and three ones,
are both numbers qua more than one, but
different
numbers gua two and three respectively,
and so with the rest)
(Physics, 207bl2 ff;
wicksteed and
Cornford translation)
.

.

.

In the Physics passage, we are
told that a collection is numbered provided that it
26
is a plurality.

Which species of the genus the numerical
property of
the collection falls under depends,
apparently,

upon

how many things are in the collection.

It is perhaps

superfluous to point out the distinct ring
of circularity in this account.
The circularity is even more apparent
in the Metap hysics passage. There we are told that the essence of
6

is what it is once.

txie

Now

a

proper definition gives

essence of that which is defined, so it seems that

the definition of 'six' will be 'six ones'.

If this is

also the genus-species definition, we are left
uninformed.
The genus seems to be "ones", which fits nicely
since it

can be taken to imply a measured plurality, that is,
number.

26.

But to give "six" as the differentia of the species

Strictly speaking, it is numbered only if it is a
measured plurality, but this restriction may be implied in the phrase "more than one". A tedious argument drawing out that implication is not to the
point here.
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S1X S6emS t0 be like

"man " as the differentia
of

the species man.
It should be pointed out
that the Metaphysics pas-

sage is not totally uninformative.

We are told that the

essence of six is that it is six
ones.
Six is essentially
composed of six ones, and not
essentially composed of two
three's or three two's. While
it may be an essential
attribute of six that it is the
product of two
and three,

(since this follows from the
definitions of six, two, and
three), it is unacceptable to offer
"the product of two

and three" as a definition of six.

But this does little

to alleviate the intellectual
pain caused by the circulairi-ty

of the definition.

What can Aristotle be getting at in
these passages?
Clearly two and three are both pluralities,
and they

seem to be pluralities of different kinds.
more than two

-

Three is

one is almost tempted to say that three

is more of a plurality than two.

But the difference

cannot be one of degree of plurality, for things
do not
partake of a genus in degrees:
der a genus or it does not.

a

thing either falls un-

One has an intuitive sense

that the plurality of two is somehow different from the

plurality of three, but formulating that difference without making refernce to number is, at best, a difficult
task, and Aristotle offers no help in the project.
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It is worth noting that this
problem is not confined to Aristotle's account
of number.
He is quite

prepared to speak of color as a
genus, with the various
shades of color as species.
Here again, the problem of
providing differentiae will be acute,
perhaps even more
so than in the case of number.
The integers at least
have the advantage of being discrete.
The color spectrum
is continuous, and the prospects
of providing differentiae distinguishing green from
blue which do not leave gaps
in the spectrum are not bright.
I

do not profess to be able to give a
completely

adequate account of the differentiae of
the genus Number.
What I shall attempt to do is to provide
some account of
the differentiae, an account of how we
can distinguish
a number of one species from a number
of another species,

and an account of why the natural numbers
are ordered in
the usual way.

Number is so-many units.

The differentiae of Num-

ber seem to be connected in some way with the quantity
of units.

Arithmetic assumes both the existence and mean-

ing of units

.

I

take it that the force of assuming the

meaning" of unit is something like assuming that one can

recognize units and distinguish one from another.

Thus,

when confronted with a plurality of things of some kind.
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it is assumed that one can
recognize first that it is
a plurality, and second,
what the individuals or units

in the plurality are.

Given this assumption and two
pluralities, A and
B, one can determine
whether or not A and B are of
the
same number,

that is, one can determine
whether the
numerical property of A is of the
same species as that
of B.
One distinguishes the (potential) 27
units in A,
and those in B, and matches them
one-to-one.
One marks
off the individuals in A one at
a time, and marks off
one individual in B for each one
marked off in A.
if
one exhausts the individuals of B
before exhausting the

individuals of A, A is larger than

B,

and vice versa.

If A and B are exhausted together,
then the number of

A is

(specifically) the same as the number of B.
It should be noted that we need not restrict
the

sort of comparison described in the preceeding
para-

graph to pairs of collections which have
ure,

as we do in the case of Addition.

collections must have

a

measure

-

a

common meas-

Each of the

each collection must

be of individuals all of which fall under some single

genus or species

27.

See page

68.

-

for otherwise the collections would
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not be numbered at all.

But there need not be a
single

measure which measures both
collections. This is because comparing the two
collections does not involve
combining them.
We can compare, with respect
to number, a collection of goats with a collection
of colors.
All that is
required is that for each individual
color that is

marked off, an individual goat is
marked off as well.
The two collections remain quite
distinct
throughout.

In adding a number of goats
to a number of colors, however, we are combining the two
collections into one.

But the single collection which
results from the combination will not be measured, and hence
not be numbered, because there is no measure
common to goats and
colors.
Thus, addition is precluded where mere
compar-

ison is not.

How does the ordering of the species of Number
come about?

The species will presumably be distinguish-

ed by differentiae of the genus Number, and those dif-

ferentiae will have something to do with quantity, since

Quantity is the category in which Number falls.

Though

it is difficult to say precisely what the differentiae

are, we can say that two quantities differ with respect
to quantity when one is more and the other less.

The
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relative terms 'more' and 'less', which
have primary
application in the category of Quantity,
thus provide
a key to the differentiae of
the species

of Number, and

it will be through those differentiae
that the ordering

of numbers comes about.

Aristotle consistently maintains that one
is not
a number. 28
The first number, then, is two, and
that
two is the first number can be shown by
appeal to the

relative terms 'more' and 'less'.

Two is the first

number because every other number is more
than it;

when any two-collection is compared with any
other numbered collection which is not a two-collection,
the

two-collection will be exhausted before the other collection. ^Three is the next number because it is
more

than two by only one.

Those collections are three which,

when compared with a two-collection, have one individual

constituent remaining when the two— collection is exhausted.

Thus, there can be no number greater than two

but less than three.

28.

The ordering of the species of

Since Number is a plurality of a certain kind,
namely measured plurality, and since one, or a unit,
in so far as it is a unit, is not a plurality at all,
one can not fall under the genus Number.
(cf. Met. I
105 3a26 - 30)

29.

2^

.

Aristotle construes fractions as ratios of numbers.
They are not themselves numbers.
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Number by reference to the relative
terms 'more
r

less

1

and

leads to an ordering which proceeds
by the addition of ones a procedure which
Aristotle seems to be
'

,

m

sympathy,

vii)

(cf.

Metaphysics M, particularly chapter

.

One might then offer a recursive account
of the

differentiae of Number:
The differentia of two is "one more than one".
The differentia of three is "one more than
two".
The differentia of n+1 is "one more than
n".

The recursive process gets started because one
is not
a number, and hence need not be provided
with a dif-

ferentia of Number.
Given a collection of things, how does one determine what numerical property that collection has?

The

obvious answer is that one counts the things in the
c

llection

,

but what guarantee is there that counting

will give the correct answer?

What does counting a-

mount to?
I

think that counting can be viewed in this context

as a series of successive comparisons.

Counting is a

well-defined procedure for constructing collections whose
numbers we know.

We compare the constructed collections

with the collection whose number we want to know.

When
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we find a constructed collection
whose number is equal
to that of the collection in
question, „e know that the
number of the collection with
which we started is (specifically) the same as that of the
constructed collection whose number we know.
The collections we construct in
counting are sim-

ply sub-collections of the collection
whose number we
want to determine. We start with a
plurality, and pick
one of the individuals in the plurality.
We consider
that part of the plurality both as a separate
entity
and as a part of the total.
Thus, in marking off one
in the sub-collection, we are also marking
off one in

the total collection.

We note that the collection has

not been exhausted by marking off this part,
so we know

collection is more than one.

We now compare

the collection to a sub-collection whose number
is two,

by adding one individual of the collection to the indi-

vidual first isolated.

Again, we note that the collec-

tion is not exhausted, so that its number must be more
than two.

We add another individual to the sub-collec-

tion and compare the whole collection to this part.

We

continue this procedure until we reach an (improper)

sub-collection whose number is the same as that of the
whole collection, because the whole collection is ex-

hausted when all of the individuals of the sub-collection have been marked off.

We know the number of the
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sub-collection, because we have
generated the sub-collections by adding ones, and hence
we know the differentia of each sub-collection. And
we know that the
number of the collection is equal
to the number of
that sub-collection, so we know the
number of the collection.

A picture may be helpful here.

Consider

a col-

lection of marbles in a box:

I

0

0

0

0

want to determine how many marbles are in the
box.

begin by moving one marble over, marking it off.

The

situation is now this:

0

0

0
I

0

have picked out a sub collection of the collection,

and now compare the quantity of the collection to that
of the sub-collection.

I

mark off the one

gated, thus exhausting the sub-collection.

I

have segreBut

I

have

at the same time marked off a one in the total collection,
so

I

have matched the individuals in the sub-collection

with those in the whole collection one-to-one.

I

note
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that the collection has not been
exhausted, so I know
that the collection is more than one it is numbered.
I therefore compare it with
a sub-collection whose number is two, constructed by adding
another individual to
the one already segregated.
I know that this sub-collection is a two because I know that it is
one more

than one, and this is the differentia
of two.

I

compare

the total collection to this sub-collection
as before,

and note that the collection is not exhausted
when the

sub-collection is.

So

I

repeat the procedure, construc-

ting a three-sub-collection and comparing the
collection

with it.

When

I

construct the four sub-collection,

I

find that matching the individuals in it with those
in
the collection exhausts the collection, and so the
num-

ber of the collection is the same as that of the sub-

collection, whose number

I

know to be four.

No doubt a good deal more remains to be said about

Number:

the relative nature of numbers is of interest,

as is the counterf actual nature of certain Arithmetical

claims.

But such considerations go beyong the limited

scope of this chapter.
fold:

The goal at the outset was three-

first, to determine what genus Arithmetic inves-

tigates;

second, to give an account of the existence

of that genus in terms of the existence of the individu-

9-2

als falling under species of
the genus;

and third, to

show that the existence of those
individuals is dependent upon the existence of substance.
The first two parts of that goal
have been reached:
the genus of Arithmetic is Number,
the individual numbers are quantitative properties of
collections of

things.

But what of the third point?

How is the exis-

tence of Number dependent upon the
existence of substances?

Numbers are properties of collections.

Were there

no collections, there would be no numbers,
for there

would be no properties of collections.
are collections of things:

qualities, etc.

But collections

collections of substances,

The things in a collection must fall

into the various categories, and the existence of
things
in any category depends upon the existence of
substances.

Thus, since the existence of numbers depends upon the

existence of collections, and the existence of collections
depends upon the existence of substances

,

the appropriate

dependence of the existence of Number on the existence of
substances is established.
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CHAPTER

iv

THE GENUS OF GEOMETRY

Because so much of geometric reasoning
involves
appeal to various geometric figures,
it is natural
to suppose that Geometry is a
science which investigates the essential natures of such
figures as cubes,

parallelograms, etc.

In seeking the genus knowledge

of whose essential nature is the goal
of Geometry,

one's first inclination is to suppose
that that genus
is Geometric Figure, perhaps with
Plane Figure and

Solid Figure as sub-genera.

Triangle, Square, etc.,

would be species of the former, and Cube,
Sphere, etc.,
species of the latter.
Such a view is supported
by

t aphy sics D,

where Aristotle says:

There is genus in the sense in which 'plane'
is the genus of plane figures and 'solid'
of solids;
for each of the figures is in
the one case a plane of such and such a
and in the other a solid of such and
such a kind;
and this is what underlies
the differentiae.
Met D, 1024bl ff)
(

.

If Geometric Figure is the genus of Geometry,

some

account of the existence of that genus must be offered.

Platonism is unacceptable to Aristotle, so we cannot
suppose that geometric figures exist independently of
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the mind in a realm of non-sensible

N°r

'

,

abstract entities.

if Geometric Figure is the
genus of Geometry, can

we suppose that the geometric
figures exist only in
the mind, for the reasons offered
in chapter one.
in

order to make good the claim that
Geometric Figure is
the genus of Geometry, one must
provide an account of
the existence of triangles, spheres,
etc., in terms
of the existence of sensible substances.

Metap hysics M.3, Aristotle offers as one
char-

acterization of geometric objects and their
existence
For just as there can be many propositions
about things merely qua movable, without
essential reference to the nature of each
one or to their attributes, and it does
not necessarily follow from this either that
there is something movable which exists in
separation from sensible things or that
there is a distinct movable nature in sensible things;
so too there will be propositions and sciences which apply to movable
things not qua movable but qua corporeal
only;
and again qua planes only and qua
lines only, and qua divisible, and qua indivisible but having position, and qua indivisible.
Therefore, since it is true to
say in a general sense not only that things
which are separable but that things which
are inseparable exist, e.g. that movable
things exist, it is also true to say in a
general sense that mathematical objects
exist, and in such a form as mathematicians
describe them.
If the things of which it
[geometry] treats are accidentally sensible
although it does not treat of them qua sensible, it does not follow that the mathematical sciences treat of sensible things nor, on the other hand, that they treat of
other things which exist independently apart
fr ° m thSSe
(Met. M, 1077b24 ff)
,

.

-

.
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This passage suggests that
geometric objects simply are sensible objects, thought
about in a certain
way - in particular, thought
of without regard to any
properties except those connected
in some appropriate
way with the extendedness of
the object in question.

Perhaps the most natural way to
understand such a
doctrine, if Geometric Figure is the
genus of Geometry,
is to take as geometric
objects circles,
cubes, etc.,

and attribute to them the same
sort of existence attributed to colors: an existence dependent
upon their
inhering in sensible substances as
properties.
Colors
exist because sensible substances are
colored;
circles
and cubes exist because there are
circular and cubical

sensible substances:

circles and cubes are the shapes

of certain sensible substances.

But such a view cannot be attributed to
Aristotle.
He does not think that the shapes of
sensible substances

fulfill the definitions of the geometer,

Metaphysics M.2).

(cf

.

,

e.g.

For Aristotle, no physical object is

spherical or cubical, strictly speaking.

No sensible

substance fulfills the definition of a triangle.

Cer-

tainly, if any shapes are to be our geometric objects,

those shapes are triangles and the like, not shapes

which approximate them, however closely.

The theorems
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of Geometry are about the former,
not the latter.
Yet
it is the latter, not the
former, which are the shapes
of sensible substances.

One might at this point look to
the Physics, where,
at 193b24, we find:
... for natural bodies have
surfaces and
occupy spaces, have lengths and
present
points, all of which are subjects
of
mathematical study... Physicists, astronomers, and mathematicians, then,
all have
to deal with lines, figures, and
the
rest.
But the mathematician is not concerned with these concepts qua boundaries
of natural bodies, nor with their
properties
as manifested in such bodies.
Therefore
he abstracts them from physical
conditions.

Noting this passage, one might be tempted
to argue as
follows:
the fact that no sensible substances
have
shapes which precisely fulfill the definitions
of geometric figures may be merely contingent;
it is, at

most, a matter of physical necessity.

What Aristotle

proposes is that geometers abstract from all of
the

physical conditions of sensible substances when
reason
ing about them geometrically.

So the geometer can ab-

stract from the physical impossibility, and suppose
that the sensible substance in question is cubical,
spherical, or whatever.
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Such an argument is misguided.

I

do not dispute

for a moment the claim that,
if we ignore all conditions
imposed by physical necessity, we
can imagine a sensible
substance which is precisely cubical.
a similar claim,
in fact, will function in an
important way in my own
proposal.
But our ability to imagine such
a sensible
substance does not mitigate the fact
that no such substance actually exists. Any pure shape
which we reach
by abstracting the other properties
of a sensible substance will be the shape of that
substance. Abstracting other properties of a sensible
substance from its

shape does not alter in any way the
shape of that substance.
Thus, if no perfectly square sensible
sub-

stances exist, we will not arrive at a
square by subtracting properties like weight, color, etc.,
from any
sensible substance.
e

s,

So, whatever our imaginative pow-

it is still true that Geometric Figure does
not

exist as a genus for Geometry, if its existence
is de-

pendent upon geometric figures being the shapes of
some actual sensible substances.

A promising move suggested to me by Robert Sleigh
is to grant that geometric figures are not the shapes

of sensible substances we encounter in experience, but

allow that we can, at least in principle, produce sen-
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sible substances of the
appropriate sort, and identify the geometric objects
with the shapes of these.
That is, we may not be able to
find a sensible substance which is in fact cubical,
but we can find one
which is a close approximation
to a cube.

Then, we

might "extract” a cube from this
sensible substance by
cutting away the irregular parts,
much as a sculptor
extracts a statue from marble by
cutting
away the ex-

traneous pieces.

Let me refer to such theoretically

extractable substances as inherent substances.

Cubical

and spherical substances might then
be said to exist in
other sensible substances, as inherent
substances.
We

might then identify the geometric objects
with the
shapes of certain of these inherent substances.
We should be cautious here.

It is not clear that

we can assert that these inherent substances
actually

exist as parts of the sensible substances which
we encounter.

The Categories suggests that there is no gen-

eral prohibition against one substance being "in" another
as part in whole

The fact that the parts of substances appear
to be present in the whole as in a subject,
should not make us apprehensive lest we should
have to admit that such parts are not substances, for in explaining the phrase 'being
present in a subject', we stated that we meant
'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.
(Cat., 3a28
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But we saw in the last chapter
that Metaphysics z
precludes the possibility of any
substance existing
actually and functioning as part
of another substance,
(see pages 67 - 68).
Any substance-like part of a
substance,
a hand, for example
), is only potentially a
substance.
I would contend,
therefore, that the inherent substances are only potentially
existent, not
actually so, and their shapes are only
potentially
existent as well. The proponent of
the inherent substance view may accept this result,
and point out that
the view that geometric objects exist
only potentially
(

is at least suggested by Aristotle
at Metaphysics

1078a30, if we accept the suggestion of
Tredennik and

Armstrong that 'matter' refers to potentiality:
v 3

«-

Hence for this reason the geometricians are
in what they maintain, and treat
of what really exists;
i.e., the objects
of geometry really exist.
For things can
exist in two ways, either in complete reality or as matter.
In his influential paper,

"Aristotle on Geometrical

Objects ,3^ ian Mueller offers an interpretation on which
the connection between geometric figures and sensible

substances is more subtle than any we have considered sc
far.

30.

Mueller recognizes the need for providing for some

Op.

cit.
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connection between the objects of
Geometry,
takes to be the geometric
figures),

(which he

and the Physical

world
is not willing to construe
“Z u Aristotle objects
mathematical
as merely mental
construction 3 dependent on human
thought
for their existence.
Aristotle, of course
does place emphasis on the role
of human
thinking
Mathematics but he also accepts
the Platonic assumption that
there must be
a significant correlation
between the
aP a
nt ob 3 ects of mathematical
reasoning
? f?
and
the real world.
31
'

m

But he does not construe geometric
figures as properties
of sensible substances at all.
Rather, geometric figures are particular entities consisting
of geometric

properties imposed upon intelligible matter.

The intel-

ligible matter underlying these geometric
properties
also underlies the sensible properties
had by sensible

substances

:

There is then, at least an initial plausiin supposing Aristotle to have entertained a conception of mathematical objects, not as matterless properties, but
as substance-like individuals with a special
matter - intelligible matter.
,

32

Regardless of how he treats points, Aristotle
seems to have the idea of the purely dimensional underlying other properties.
In part,
this is the idea of the three-dimensional
underlying sensible properties in the physical

31.

Ibid

,

page 157.

32.

Ibid

,

page 164.
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f ° r Arist °tle,
there is little
S en e betWeen this
^ea and
£hat of tte o !
al under lyingHgeome trie
properties^hich"'
Ch
he calls intelligible
matte??
33

if^nv

'

Mueller's account involves
drawing a direct parallel between sensible
substances and geometric
figures:
sensible objects consist of
physical matter formed in
a certain way through the
imposition of physical proper
ties;
geometric objects consist of
intelligible matter
formed in a certain way through
the imposition
of geo-

metric properties.

Geometric objects are what Mueller
refers to as geometric particulars:
a particular

parcel of intelligible matter with
the form of a square,
a particular parcel of
intelligible matter with the

form of a tetrahedron, etc.
There are four major points to Mueller's
interpretation
:

1)

Geometric objects are particular straight
and

curved lines, triangles, spheres, etc.;
2)

These geometric particulars consist of
intelligi-

ble matter, on which are imposed geometric
properties:

straightness, triangularity, etc.;
3)

Because intelligible matter, extension, underlies

sensible properties, geometry has application to sensi33.

Ibid

,

page 166.
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ble substances.

(On page 161, Mueller says:

"Mathe-

matics is applicable to reality
whereas the study of
forms advocated by Plato has no
application whatsoever.
In the sequel I will argue
that Aristotle explains
this applicability by considering
mathematical objects
to underlie physical reality").
4)

nses

The universality of the theorems
of geometry aout of reasoning about the geometric
particulars

in a special way, viz., conceptually.

As an account of geometric figures and
their

existence, Mueller's interpretation of Aristotle
has

much to recommend it, and similarities will be
evident
between his account and my own to be offered later.
But the tone of Mueller's paper suggests that he is

trying to do more than simply explain what geometric
figures are and how they exist.

He attempts to explain

why geometric knowledge is applicable to sensible reality by explaining how geometric figures are related to

sensible substances, and this suggests that, on Mueller's
view, Geometry is a science of or about geometric figures:

that Geometric Figure is the genus whose essen-

tial nature Geometry investigates.

Mueller has in mind,

I

If this is what

think that his account fails.
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If Geometric Figure is
the genus of Geometry,
then

geometric figures ought to have
an existence independent of mind. This is a
point

which, as we have seen,

Mueller himself grants, and it
is one which seems to
be
at the heart of Aristotelian
philosophy of science.
But does Mueller's account give
us geometric figures
which are not mentally dependent?
On page 163, Mueller says:

"Consequently, the ob-

jects in terms of which mathematical
argument proceeds
are intuitively perceived or
imagined spatial objects,
points, plane figures, solids".
If the spatial objects
are imagined, I take it the picture
is something like
this:
the mathematician derives intelligible
matter,
or a concept of it, by abstracting
from sensible substances their sensible properties, thus
obtaining the

quantitative and continuous in three dimensions.

The

mathematician then imposes, in imagination, certain
properties on that intelligible matter, namely,
geometric properties like straightness, triangularity,
etc.

The result is a geometric particular about which
the

geometer reasons.
A problem arises in reconciling this picture with
the requirement that mathematical objects be independent

of human thought, non-mental.

For on this picture, all
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that exists as a qualification
of substance is intelligible matter. The geometric
figures themselves arise
only as a result of a mental
process:
the imposition
in imagination of geometric
properties on intelligible
matter. Obviously, if no minds
existed, neither would
geometric objects, on this account,
and this result is
precisely one which Mueller seeks
to avoid.
The situation is not much improved
if we adopt the
other alternative suggested by
Mueller, and suppose that
these geometric figures are not
imagined but apprehended
by intuition.
The idea here is presumably that
the geo-

metric properties are imposed upon
intelligible matter
independently of human thought or perception,
in the

same way that physical properties are
imposed upon

physical matter.

Geometric objects exist independently

of the mind, are merely apprehended
by intuition, and

then reasoned about.

This avoids making geometric fig-

ures mental entities, but is open to other
objections.

Let us consider some particular parcel of intelli-

gible matter, that underlying the sensible properties
of the desk on which

I

am now working.

To preserve a

non-mental existence for Mueller's geometric figures,
we must suppose that that parcel has certain figure-

properties, like squareness, triangularity, etc., inde-
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pendently of any ratiocination on
our part. Now it is
surely implausible to suppose that
when I look at my
desk, and disregard all of its
sensible properties, (if
it is even possible to do this),
I apprehend, by intuition or anything else, some set
of geometric figures.
If I apprehend any shape at
all when I abstract all

sensible properties, it would seem to
be the shape of
my desk.
That surely will not serve Mueller's
purpose,
for he rejects the view that geometric
figures
are

shapes of sensible substances.

Yet to claim that ab-

straction of sensible properties leaves me
with the

apprehension of some specifiable set of geometric
particulars is, at best, untrue.
There is a further problem for Mueller's view, if
he is proposing Geometric Figure as the genus
for Geo-

metry.

Mueller recognizes that geometric knowledge must

applicability to the sensible world.

On his view,

geometric knowledge will be knowledge of the essential
nature of such things as triangles and cubes.

This

knowledge, we are told, will be applicable to sensible

substances because the same matter which underlies the

geometric properties also underlies the sensible properties of substances.

But what reason is there to sup-

pose that any knowledge of the essential nature of objects consisting of intelligible matter with certain
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very peculiar properties,
properties never to be met
with in sensible substances
themselves, will be applicable to those substances, which
have properties of a
very different sort? What, if
anything, do we learn
about intelligible matter itself
in studying geometric
figures, that we could then apply
to objects of an entirely different sort simply in
virtue of the fact that
the same intelligible matter is
somehow associated with
them?

When we study sensible substances, we
learn about
the forms of those substances, their
essential
and

accidental properties.
matter, qua matter.

We learn nothing about their

The behaviour and characteristics

of such objects are explained by
reference to their

forms.

If we are to take Mueller's analogy
between ge-

ometric objects and sensible substances seriously,
it
would seem that geometric knowledge is knowledge
of

form, not of matter;

Aristotle says:
forms;

stratum.

and in the Posterior Analytics,

"For the mathematical sciences concern

they do not demonstrate properties of a sub.

.

,

(79a9

)

.

So it is difficult to see how an

investigation of the forms of objects with peculiar
formal properties could yield useful information about

objects with very different formal features, simply in
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virtue of the fact that the matter
of the former "in
some sense underlies" the properties
of
the latter.

Let me clarify the scope of my
objections to
Mueller.
it is my view that his account
of geometric
objects is, on the whole, attractive,
when it is as-

sumed that particular geometric figures
are mental

constructions:

when the imposition of geometric prop-

erties on intelligible matter is taken
to be an activity of the mind. My own account of
geometric figures will be very close to this
interpretation of

Mueller.

What

I

have been arguing is that Mueller's

account is not sufficient to warrant taking
Geometric
Figure as the genus of Geometry:

it does not justify

the supposition that the essential natures
of geometric

figures are an appropriate subject of investigation
for
Geometry.

If geometric figures are imagined spatial

entities, we are left with a Constructivist ontology for
Geometry.

If they are not imagined,

it is difficult to

determine just where and how they do exist.

And in

either case, the applicability of knowledge of the essential nature of Geometric Figure to sensible substances is left unexplained.
There is a general objection to all of the inter-

pretations which suppose that it is knowledge of the
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essential natures of geometric figures
that is the goal
of Geometry.
No such interpretation fits
well with the
crucial texts.
In Metaphysics M, Aristotle repeatedly
characterizes

Geometry as the investigation of the
essential attributes
of sensible substances qua quantitative
and continuous
in three dimensions.
But Aristotle also rejects the view
that the shapes of sensible substances
fulfill the geo-

meter's definitions.

So one cannot reason about a sensi-

ble substance qua cube, because no sensible
substance is

cubical.

The gua -account of geometric objects is simply

incompatible with the view that those objects are
geo-

metric figures.
The Sleigh proposal is of no help here, because

Aristotle does not say that the geometer reasons about
something in a man qua extended, but that he reasons
about a man qua extended.

Indeed, he argues at length

that mathematical objects are not in sensible substances
at all.

In Metaphysics K, Aristotle characterizes the geo-

meter's endeavour as follows:
for before beginning his investigation
he strips off all the sensible qualities...
and leaves only the quantitative and con.

.

.
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^°

US ' sometimes in one,
sometimes in two
dimenSions '
the attfbates of the
quantitative and continuous
and dof not conslde r
them in any other
respect,
respect fd
p
and examines
the relative positions
of some and the attributes
of these
and the
commensurabilities and incommensurabilities
of others, and the ratios of
others; but
e
S:lt ° ne and the same
science of all
thio things
nh°
these
-

^
.

Geometry.

.

(Met..

In the Posterior Analytics

K,

1061a29 ff)

we find:

,

Now the things peculiar to the
science, the
existence of which must be assumed,
are the
things with reference to which
the science
investigates the essential attributes,
e.q.
arithmetic with reference to units,
and
geometry with reference to points
and lines.
.

(Post. An.

,

76a31

As we have already seen, 34 Aristotle
offers points,
lines, planes, and solids as the
objects of geometric

investigation in the Physics

.

No where does he even

mention or suggest Geometric Figure as the
genus of Geort

;try

I

propose that we accept the suggestion in the

P hysics and take as the objects of
geometric study points,

(zero-dimensional extension), lines,
tension), planes,

(one-dimensional ex-

(two-dimensional extension), and solids,

(three-dimensional extension).

In other words, we take

Extension to be the genus whose essential nature Geometry
investigates, and construe zero-, one-, two-, and three34.

See page 96.
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dimensional extension as species of that
genus.
This interpretation fits well with
the passages

from both Metaphysics M and Metaphysics

K.

in discov-

ering the essential nature of the species
of extension,
the geometer is at the same time discovering
the essen-

tial attributes of substances qua extended
in one, two,
or three dimensions.
The existence of these geometric

objects is independent of mind, but dependent
on the

existence of sensible substances.

One- and two-dimen-

sional extension exist as restrictions or limits
of

three-dimensional extension, but three-dimensional ex-

tension itself exists only because there are three-dimensional objects, sensible substances.

Were there no sen-

sible substances, there would be nothing extended,
and
so no Extension.

What, then, is the status of geometric figures:

triangles, cubes, and the rest?

of

Since knowledge of the

essential natures of geometric figures is not the primary
or proper goal of Geometry, we need not feel constrained
to give an account of the existence of geometric figures

which makes that existence independent of mind.

The

proper concern of Geometry is the discovery of the essential nature of Extension, and Extension exists whether

geometric figures do or not.

Ill

have little to say against
one who is attracted
either by the inherent substance
account of geometric
figures or by the view that
particular parcels of intelligible matter underlying
particular sensible substances have imposed upon them
geometric forms like
triangularity, sphericity, etc.,
different from the
actual shapes of those substances.
I find the former
view unattractive because the inherent
substances are
only potentially existent, so their
shapes are potentially existent as well. Moreover,
that view seems to
be contradicted by Aristotle's
remark in Metaphysics B,
I

,

(1002a20)

m

.

Besides this, no sort of shape is
present

the solid more than any other;

is not

m

so that if the Hermes

the stone, neither is the half of the
cube in

the cube as something determinate..."

The latter view

simply strikes me as being terribly implausible.
It seems to me to be preferable to construe
geomet-

ric figures as purely conceptual tools, theoretical
en-

tities which the geometer employs to facilitate his
in-

vestigation of the essential nature of Extension.

In

investigating the essential nature of lines, the geometer
is reasoning about lengths.

The knowledge which he ac-

quires is applicable to sensible substances in so far
as one is concerned to know what is true of a substance
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in virtue of the fact that
it has a given length,
without regard to its width, depth,
or other sensible properties.
Often, the geometer is concerned
with relation
al properties holding among
several lines: given that
three lines are related in such
and such a way, what
other relations must hold among
them? It is simply

easier to keep track of a single
entity which is triangular than it is to keep track
of three entities
with certain relations holding among
them,

so the geo-

meter unifies the entities and relations,
and forms a
picture or concept of a single entity a triangle.
In so far as the definitions of
geometric figures

are taken to be definitions of
individuals of some sort
the things defined exist only in
the mind.
Geometric

figures, as unified entities, are the
peculiar objects
of thought discussed in the passage quoted
from Meta-

physics L in chapter one.

The thought of a geometric

figure and the geometric figure are one and
the same

-

there is nothing distinct from the mind of which
the

mind is thinking.
a triangle,

The mind, having adopted the form of

is the triangle it is thinking about, and

there is no triangle anywhere else.
This interpretation finds some support in Metaphysics

Z,

where Aristotle says:
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3 circle
is the same as the
2*^1being
circle*" and
circle,
a soul' the same as the
BU WhSn WS C ° me t0 the
concrete
indi" •h
!
individual,
e.g., this circle, i. e one
of
the individual circles, whether
perceptible
or intelligible (I mean by
intelligible
circles the mathematical, and by
perceptible
circles those of bronze and of wood)
of these there is no definition,
but' they
are known by the aid of intuitive
thinking
or of perception;
and when they pass out
of this complete realization
it is not
clear whether they exist or not.
(Met, z, 10 36al ff)
'

:

.

Mathematical circles have, as their realm
of "complete
realization/' thought.

Aristotle is not prepared to

commit himself on whether these particular
mathematical
circles exist when they are not being
thought about,
but on the proposal being put forward
here, they do not.
A particular mathematical circle is the
result of the
mind's adopting a certain form, and, as soon
as the mind
ceases to have that form, (as soon as it stops
thinking
of the circle)

,

the circle ceases to exist.

But the definitions of geometric figures can also
be understood, not as definitions of things of some
sort

but as prescriptions or recipes for relating lines or

planes in certain ways:

a square

related in such and such a way;
planes related in such and such

consists of four lines
a cube consists of six

a way;

and so forth.

Thus understood, the definitions are not definitions of

individual, unified entities at all.

Rather, geometric
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figures are complexes of entities
related in specified
ways, and the defintions of these
figures are merely

stipulations of what entities are to
be related and
what relations are to hold among them.
When geometric
figures are construed as complexes or
relational entities, even the knowledge of geometric
figures acquired
by the geometer need not be taken
to be about entities

which do not in any way exist in the
sensible world.
Rather, knowledge of geometric figures
is knowledge about the relational properties of entities
which do
exist
the sensible world, as quantitative
properties
of sensible substances.

m
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CHAPTER

v

INFINITY

The discussion of the
ontological foundations of
mathematics has centered on the
existence of the genera

whose essential attributes the
mathematical sciences
investigate.
If Aristotle's account
of

demonstrate

science in general, and mathematics
in particular, is
correct, the justification of the
ontological presuppositions of mathematics is now
complete.
Theoretically at least, in so far as
Arithmetic and Geometry
make appeal to a notion of infinity,
the nature of the
infinite should be deducible from the
basic premisses
of those sciences. But the notion of
infinity is sufficiently obscure, and its role in both
Arithmetic and
Geometry sufficiently important, that a
separate disc

ission of Aristotle's account of infinity
is well

worth while.
Aristotle

s roost

thorough discussion of infinity

is to be found in Physics G, chapters four through

eight.

Much of what he says there is repeated in Meta-

phys i cs

K,

chapter ten.

is abbreviated,

The account in the Metaphysics

and offers no significant additions to

the Physics account, so the discussion here will focus

exclusively on the Physics.
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Aristotle argues, in chapters
four and five of
that there is n ° actual complete
gjgS1CS G
'

infinity.

To summarize those arguments:
The infinite does not exist either
as a substance

or as a principle of substances.

substance

,

Were the infinite a

as Plato and the Pythagoreans
maintained,

it would be, qua infinite, indivisible,
just as a man

qua man is indivisible.

But this, Aristotle maintains,

is not what is meant by those who
say that the infinite

exists.

'The infinite'

is supposed to refer to some-

thing which, though it can be traversed
or gone through
partially can not be traversed or gone through
,

pletely.

com-

But what can be traversed even partially
is

divisible, because all motion is divisible.

other hand, were the infinite to exist as

a

On the

material

principle of substances, as Anaximander proposes,
then
parts of the infinite would be infinite, just as
parts
of air are air.

finities
nature.

,

"But the same thing cannot be many in-

(204a25)

so the infinite cannot be of this

Moreover:

Everything can be resolved into the elements
of which it is composed.
Hence the body in
question would have been present in our world
here, alongside air and fire and earth and
water:
but nothing of the kind is observed.
(Phys
204b33 ff
.

,
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When we analyze the sensible objects
around us, we find
them to be composed of the elements,
and in no case do

we find anything other than these
elements, as we should
if the infinite were a material
principle.
The infinite, then, does not have a
substantive

existence:

it is neither a substance nor the
material

principle of a substance.
ization of an adjective,

'The infinite'

(204a29).

is the nominal-

Just as 'the red'

may be used to refer to, say, some particular
red chair,
so

'the infinite' might refer to something.

But infin-

ity is no more the essence of that to which 'the
infinite

refers, if it does refer, than redness is the essence

of a red chair.

Infinity, if it exists at all, exists

as a quantitative property of something whose essence

neither is nor includes "to be infinite".
But infinity is not an actual quantitative property
of any body.

No one of the elements can be infinite in

quantity, nor can more than one element be infinite in
quantity.

The former follows from the fact that each

element has a contrary opposed to it, and an infinite
quantity of one would have destroyed any finite quantity
of its contrary.

The latter is impossible because

"'Body is what has extension in all directions and the
1
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infinite is what is boundlessly extended,
so that the
infinite body would be extended in all
directions ad
infinitum", (204b20)
Hence there could not be two
.

such bodies, because they would limit
one another.
There cannot be an infinite multiplicity
of elements,
because this would violate the doctrine that
every

element has a natural place,

(presumably, because there

are not infinitely many places in the finite
universe).

Finally, there is no infinite sensible body, for
the

very good reason that we do not observe any such
body.
Infinity does not exist as

a

substance, as men and

horses do, nor does it exist as

a

property of substance.

It seems to follow from this, together with Aristotle's

general metaphysical position, that everything that
®xi.s>ts

is either a substance or a gualif ication of sub-

stance, that infinity does not exist in any sense at

34.

The absence of criticism of the arguments sketched
should not be interpreted as endorsement of those
arguments.
It is no doubt an interesting question
whether Aristotle's views on Physics genuinely forced
upon him the conclusion that there could be no infinite body, but that question lies outside the range
of my concerns here.
What is important is that Aristotle held that there could be no infinite magnitude.
The interesting question then becomes, what
limitations, if any, does Aristotle's position on
infinity place upon mathematics as an Aristotelian
science?
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Aristotle, however

is not prepared to
accept the

conclusion that nothing is in
any sense infinite:

^

t0 su
infinite does not exist in anyPP ose that the
way leads
imP ossible consequences:
there will be ““k
there^iL^
a beginning and an end
of time
a magn 1
will not be divisible into magnitudes, number will not be infinite.
if
ln
SW of the above considerations'
Ti
neither alternative seems possible,
an arbiter must be called in;
clearly there is
a sense in which the infinite
exists and
another
which it does not.
Phys
206a ff

doe^^

^

.

m

(

.

,

My concern in this chapter is to
spell out the sense in
which the infinite exists, and discuss
the consequences
of that account for the mathematical
sciences.
Having argued against the possibility
of an infinite
extension or an infinite body, Aristotle begins
his positive account of what infinity is and in
what sense it
exists
We must keep in mind that the word 'is'
means either what potentially is or what
fully is
Further, a thing is infinite either by
addition or by division.
Now, as we have seen, magnitude is not
actually infinite. But by division it is
infinite... The alternative then remains
that the infinite has a potential existence
But the phrase 'potential existence' is
ambiguous
When we speak of the potential
existence of a statue we mean that there
will be an actual statue.
It is not so
with the infinite.
There will not be an
actual infinite.
.

.

(Phys

.

206al4 ff)
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Focusing on just this much of
Aristotle's account,
one is tempted to interpret him
as distinguishing between two kinds of potentiality:
some things have a

potentiality that will at some time be
actualized,
while other things have a potentiality

that will never

be actualized. 35

The latter kind of potentiality
be-

longs to things which are always
potentially existent,
never actually so, and infinity exists
in the sense
that it has this sort of potential
existence.

But does it make sense to speak of a
potentiality

that can never be actualized?

Aristotle consistently

maintains that actuality is prior to potentiality,
and

consistently elucidates the notion of potentiality
in
terms of actuality,

(cf.,

for example, Metaphysics e.

chapters seven through nine).

Actuality is primary,

potentiality secondary and dependent upon actuality.
Thus it is not clear that the notion of a potentiality

that could never be actualized even makes sense.
if
C,

rx

is potentially

then x will be F

1

F*

-J
,

is to be understood as

,

because the consequent of

the conditional is always false.

See Evans, Melbourne G.

Aristotle

.

r
If A, B,

the notion of an unactuaiizable

potentiality becomes vacuous

35.

Indeed,

This has led some phil-

The Physical Philosophy of
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osophers to attribute to Aristotle
a "principle of
36
plenitude",
which Jaakko Hintikka formulates
roughly
as,

"... no genuine possibility
can remain unactualized

through an infinity of time ".37

The view that infinity

exists potentially but never actually
is incompatible
with this principle.
One could argue, of course, that the
principle of

plenitude applies only to those potentialities
which
are potentialities of the first kind:

that potentiality

involved in the potential existence of a statue.

The

principle of plenitude is inapplicable to potentiality
of the second kind, that kind which is ascribed
to the

existence of infinity.

But this leaves one puzzling

°ver the meaning of an expression of the form:

potentially F, but cannot be actually

^x is

7

F*

.

In order to bring Aristotle's views on infinity in\

to line with the principle of plenitude, Hintikka argues

that Aristotle is neither distinguishing senses of 'po-

tentiality' nor maintaining that infinity never actually
exists. 3 8

36.

Rather, Aristotle is distinguishing a peculiar

The name is introduced by A. 0. Love joy in The Great
Chain of Being Harvard University Press, 1942.
,

37.

Hintikka, Jaakko, "Aristotelian Infinity"

38.

Ibid.

.
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sense in which 'exists* is being
used when it is said
that infinity exists.
The Physics continues:
he word
is
has many senses, and we say
that the infinite 'is' in the
sense
which we say 'it is day' or 'it is in
the
games', because one thing after
another
is always coming into existence.
For of
these things too the distinction
between
potential and actual existence holds.
We say that there are Olympic games,
both in the sense that they may occur
and that they are actually occurring...
For generally the infinite has this
mode
of existence:
one thing is always being
taken from another, and each thing that
is taken is always finite but always
different.
Phys
206 a 20 ff
(

.

,

What Hintikka suggests, on the basis of this
passage, is that it is quite true to say that
the infinite

cannot exist actually, if what is meant is that
it cannot be that all of the infinite is actualized at
some

particular instant of time.
sense of

exists'

tially either.

But, he argues, in that

the infinite does not exist poten-

Rather, the sense in which infinity

exists potentially is precisely the sense in which it

exists actually:

as an attribute of a process or se-

quence of events or things.

There is never a time at

which a process is, in its entirety, actual, although
there are times when it is true to say that the process
has, in its entirety, been actualized.

Rather, the pro-

cess is actualized over an interval of time, and at any
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moment during that interval
it is correct to say
that
the process is actual, in
the sense that the
process is
being actualized.
Thus, a line is infinitely
divisible, not in the
sense that it is potentially
infinitely divided but

never actually so, but rather
in the sense that there
is a process of dividing
the line which can be carried
on indefinitely.
To say that a line is divisible
is
to say that there is a
procedure for dividing the line;
to say that a line is infinitely
divisible is to say

that there is a procedure for dividing
the line which
may be repeated without limit.
That process or procedure may exist actually, when someone
is dividing
the line

,

or it may exist potentially, when no
one is

dividing the line.

Similarly, the property of being

infinite, which belongs to the process,
may be actually
existent, (when the process is actually
existent), or

potentially existent.
Hintikka interprets Aristotle's view as taking
infinity to be an attribute of a process:

"In other

words, infinity is not a term which applies to individual-

things, such as men or houses, either actually or

potentially.

Rather, it is an attribute of certain se-

quences of individual things or individual events..."
39.

Ibid

,

p.

199.

39
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One might wonder why the infinite
cannot simply be identified with the process itself,
as Aristotle himself
seems to suggest when he describes
infinity as a thing
"whose being... consists in a process
of coming
to be

or passing away;

definite if you like at each stage,
yet always different", 206 a 32 ).
(

Such an identification would be a mistake.

One of

Aristotle's objections to the view that the
infinite is
a substance is that, if it were a
substance, it would
not be divisible qua infinite. The same
holds true

for processes:

they are divisible only because they

involve movement of some sort,

('movement' is being

used here with the very broad sense that Aristotle
gives
the term
and movement is divisible

only be-

cause the distance or magnitude covered by the movement
is divisible.

Thus, if infinity is identical with a

process, it is not divisible qua infinite, because a

process is not divisible qua process.
The temptation to make the identification comes

from a consideration like the following:

it is well and

good to say that a process is actual when, strictly
speaking, some part of the process is actual.

quite another thing to say that

a

But it is

quantitative property
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of the whole process is actual
when only a part of the
process is. We do not say that
a circle is actual

when only half of it is.
is infinite

it is the whole process
which

but Aristotle himself says that
each stage
of the process is finite, and
only some stage of the
process is actual at any given moment.
,

Such an argument completely misses the
point of Aristotle's account.
Infinity is a quantitative property,
but it has a peculiar sort of existence,
similar to the

existence had, for example, by a quantity of
time.

The

existence of infinity is quite unlike the sort
of existence had by most other quantitative properties,
like

squareness, or weighing six pounds.

To say that a square

is actual, or that six pounds is actual, is
to say that

some actual thing is actually square, or that some
actual thing actually weighs six pounds.

Some quantita-

tive properties have an existence like that of substances
in so far as they exist complete and as a whole at some

particular time.
an hour:

Infinity has an existence like that of

it does not, and cannot, exist complete and

as a whole at some moment.

that it is going on.

We say that a table is, not

But if we say that this is

(actu-

ally) the hour during which E will occur, we do not mean

that the entire hour actually exists at this moment, but
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that now, this actual moment, falls
in the interval of
time during which E will occur.
Similarly, when we say
that infinity,

(or the infinite)

is actual, we are not

saying that a complete infinity is, in
its entirety,

actualized now, but that now falls in a time
period
during which infinity is being actualized.
It is important to note that whether or
not an in-

finite process is in fact carried on indefinitely
is

irrelevant in determining whether or not infinity is
actual during the time through which the process is

carried out.

That is, if an infinite process, say

halving a line segment, is carried out over some period of time and then stopped, infinity is actual during
that period of time, and ceases to be actual at the

moment at which the process is terminated.

We should

not suppose that a necessary condition for the actuality
of infinity is the actuality of a process which will in

fact be carried on indefinitely.

I

think that Hintikka's interpretation of Aristotle

is essentially correct, but he neglects one very inter-

esting feature of infinity.

Though it is, it seems to

me, incorrect to attribute to Aristotle the view that

the infinite is never in any sense actual, there can be
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no doubt that infinity has some
close connection with
potentiality, a connection somehow stronger
than its

connection with actuality.

The statement,

not be an actual infinite",

(206a20), is hardly ambigu-

"There will

ous, and it is repeated at 207bl2, in
the discussion

of the infinity of number:

"Hence this infinite is

potential, never actual..."

Aristotle was trying to

get at something here, and he thought that that
something was important enough to repeat.

Hintikka interprets these claims as attempts to emphasize the peculiar nature of the infinite.

There is,

and will be, no time at which the infinite exists as
a complete individual.

This,

I

think, is fair enough,

as far as it goes, but considerably more can be said.

Aristotle seems to take the view that a feature ui

Lque to infinite processes is that there can not be a

time at which the processes have been completed. 40

40.

Michael Jubien has pointed out that such a position
assumes that processes are made up of steps in such
a way that there is a bound on how little time can
be consumed by a step.
Without this assumption, one
can conceive of a process the first step of which
requires one minute, the second one-half minute, etc.
This will be an infinite process which requires less
than two and one-half minutes to complete.
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For processes in general,
this is not the case.
Consider the movement of an
object, X, from point A
to
point B. When X is at A, it
has the potential to be
at
B, it is potentially at
B.
The movement of X from A
to
B simply is the process of
that potentiality becoming
an actuality.
As X moves from A toward B,
more and more
of its potentiality for being
at B is becoming actualized.

When X arrives at B, its potentiality
for being
at B has been completely actualized.
X
is no longer

potentially at B at all:

it no longer has the poten-

tial for being at B because it is
actually at B. Thus,
there is no moment in time at which
one can say that
X's potentiality for being at B is
actualized in its
entirety, because as long as X is not
at B, some of that

potentiality is yet to be actualized, and once
X has
arrived at B, the potentiality for being at

B ceases to

exist at all, as long as X remains at B.

But at any

time after X has arrived at B, it is quite
correct to
say that X's potential for being at B has been
actual-

ized.

And so the process by which X's being at B was

actualized has itself been actualized.
The situation with infinite processes is quite dif-

ferent.

The potentiality of which the process is the

actualization is never exhausted.

No matter how long
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the process continues, no matter
how many tires the
procedure is repeated (in the case
of repetitive processes, like the division of line
segments or the production of numbers by the addition of
ones), the potentiality remains for the process to
continue. No matter
how much of the process has been
actualized, there is

potentially more to be actualized.

Thus, there can be

no time at which the complete process
has been actualized, at which the potentiality has been
exhausted.
The infinite will not be actual, then, in
so far as it

will never be the case that all of an infinite
process
has been actualized.
An infinite process is uncompletable

,

and it is of

the essence of an infinite process that there is
always
the potential for carrying the process further.

This

is why infinity is so closely linked with potentiality.

Thus, Aristotle says:
The infinite turns out to be the contrary
of what it is said to be.
It is not what
has nothing outside it that is infinite,
but what always has something outside it.
(Phys

.

,

20 7al ff

What are the consequences for mathematics of this
account of infinity?

For Geometry, there are no infin-

ite magnitudes, no arbitrarily long lines, either poten-

tially or actually:
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ma g n itudes the contrary
holds.
at is continuous is divided
ad infin1
itum, but there is no inf ini
te-Tn-thT
direction of increase. For the
which it can potentially be, it size
can also actually be.
Hence since no sensible magnitude is infinite, it
is impossible to exceed every assigned
magmtude,for if it were possible there
would be something bigger than
the
...

heavens

(

Phys

.

,

207bl5 ff

For Arithmetic, there is no infinity
in the sense of
an infinitely large number, either
potentially

or ac-

m

tually.

of finding

Arithmetic, the infinite is the possibility
(or

producing), for any number, a number

larger than it:
It is natural to suppose that in number
there is a limit in the direction of the
minimum, and that in the other direction
every assigned number is surpassed...
The reason is that what is one is indivisible whatever it may be, e.g. a man is one
not many.
Number on the other hand is a
plurality of 'ones' and a certain quantity
of them.
Hence number must stop at the
indivisible becausa plurality is always
divisible... But in the direction of
largeness it is always possible to think
of a larger number:
for the number of
times a magnitude can be bisected is infinite.
Hence the infinite is potential,
never actual:
the number of parts that can
be taken always surpasses any assigned number
.

(Phys.,

207bl)
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The infinity of Arithmetic is
dependent upon the
infinity of Geometry. The infinite
divisibility of

magnitude guarantees that for any
given number, there
is a larger number, at least
potentially, despite the
fact that there are only finitely many
things in the

universe.

For any given number,

a

number larger than

it exists potentially because it is
possible to divide
some magnitude sufficiently to produce
segments or

parts whose number exceeds that of the given
number.
But there is not, even potentially, an infinitely

large

number, and it is impossible that an infinity
of num-

bers should ever be actualized.
These views on infinity apparently rule out any

transfinite mathematics.

We cannot prove things about

infinite sets or collections

,

because there are no in-

finite sets or collections, even potentially.

To talk

about cb is to talk about something which does not exist
in any sense at all.
tivism,

(as

We find here strains of construc-

well as a certain charming common sense)

a science cannot deal with something which does not exist,

and the set of natural numbers does not exist even poten-

tially, because it is impossible, even theoretically, to

produce an infinity of numbers.
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The consequences of Aristotle's
views on infinity
are, if Hintikka is to be
believed, extremely serious
for Geometry.
He claims:
"Thus we have to conclude

that Aristotle's peculiar doctrine
of the existence of
maximal spatial extension made it
impossible for him
to justify fully the practice of
the geometers of his
time
Hintikka is driven to this conclusion
because he believes that he can show
first, that the
.

physical space of Aristotle's universe is
not strictly
speaking Euclidean, and second, that
the theorems of
Geometry can not be universally true.
If either of
these two points could be made good,

I

think it would

be fair to consider it a devastating weakness
in Ari-

stotle's philosophy of mathematics.
I

In fact, however,

think that neither point can be made good.

Hintikka attempts to show that Aristotle's physical
space was non-Euclidean by arguing that Euclid's fifth

postulate, the axiom of parallels, was not satisfied in
the Aristotelian universe.

Hintikka quotes Heath's

translation of the fifth postulate as stated by Euclid:
If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes

the interior angles on the same side less than two right

angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely,

meet on that side on which are the angles less than the
41.

Aristotelian Infinity", op. cit

.

,

page203.
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two right angles."

He then says:

"If there is a

maximum to the extent to which lines can
be produced,
this postulate fails", 42 and concludes,
"if

understood

according to the letter of Aristotle's
statements, his
physical universe is non-Euclidean: the axiom
of parallels is not satisfied in it". 42
If one interprets

"this postulate fails" charitably,

one understands Hintikka to be pointing out
that the

postulate is vacuously satisfied in a finite universe,
because part of the antecedent, namely, "if produced

indefinitely

,

can not be satisfied.

However, if that

is what Hintikka means, he certainly is not entitled

to conclude from the fact that the fifth postulate is

vacuously satisfied, that Aristotelian space is nonEuclidean.
In fact, there is no difficulty in taking Aristo-

telian space to be Euclidean.

The axiom of parallels

can be restated in a form which makes no appeal to ar-

bitrarily large extensions, and there is no reason to
suppose that Aristotle's finite physical space could
not satisfy the axiom non-vacuously
lel lines as follows:

.

We define paral-

Lines a and b are parallel pro-

vided any line intersecting both a and b and perpen42.

Ibid

,

page 202.

43.

Ibid

,

page 203.
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dicular to a, is perpendicular
to b.
parallels is then stated: For any

The axiom of

line, and any point

not on that line, there is
exactly one line through
that point parallel to the given
44
line.

This, to-

gether with the other postulates,
provides us with a
reasonable determination of a Euclidean
space.

Hintikka also argues that Aristotle's
account of
infinity restricts the universality of the
theorems of
Geometry.
On page 201, he cites this passage from
Aristotle
Our account does not rob the mathematicians
of their study, by disproving the actual existence of the infinite in the direction of increase, in the sense of the untraversable
in
point of fact they do not need the infinite
and do not use it.
They postulate only that
the finite straight line may be produced as
far as they wish.
It is possible to have divided in the same ratio as the largest quantity another magnitude of any size you like.
Hence, for the purposes of proof, it will make
no difference to them to have such an infinite
instead, while its existence will be in the
sphere of real magnitudes.
(Phys.
2 0 7b27 ff
.

,

44.

In fact, the axiom in this simple form will not be
satisfied by every point and every line, without additional assumptions. There will be lines perpendicular
to a diameter of the universe.
The endpoints of that
diameter are such that the only lines through them
parallel to the original line are tangents to the universe.
But these tangents would lie outside, and
hence do not exist.
There are various strategies for
remedying this, but we need not concern ourselves with
the complications here.
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Hintikka comments
He is suggesting in effect that
all that the
geometer needs is the kind of infinite
sion that exists merely as the inverse extenof infinite divisibility, and that a
geometer
therefore does not even need arbitrarily
larqe
potential extensions...
What Aristotle's statement therefore
amounts
to is to say that for each proof of
a theorem,
dealing with a given figure, there is a
sufficiently small similar figure for which
the
proof can be carried out.
in short, each
metrical theorem holds in a sufficiently geosmall
neighborhood. From this it does not follow
however, that the theorem really holds.

45

The dispute involved here can best be elucidated
in

terms of a specific example.

It is a theorem of Geometry

that any triangle inscribed in a semi-circle is a
right
triangle.

The proof of this theorem involves a construc-

tion, part of which looks like this:

One extends a line from the vertex, C, perpendicular to
the base, AB.
a

This line is extended beyond the base to

distance equal to the base, which is also the diameter

of the semi-circle.

45.

Op.

Cit.

page 202.
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Now suppose that the circle in
question is a circumference of the universe. The
construction involved

m

proving that the triangle in this
case is a right
triangle requires that a line be
extended beyond the
boundary of the universe. But, according
to Aristotle,
there is no such line, so the construction
cannot be
performed on this figure. From this, Hintikka
concludes
that the theorem does not hold for this
triangle.

Aristotle's solution is quite simple;

he points out

that the construction can be carried out on

a

similar

but smaller figure, and the truth of the theorem
thereby

demonstrated.

Hintikka objects that that alternative

construction merely proves that the smaller figure is a
right triangle, and does not establish that the theorem
holds in all cases.

Apparently, Hintikka construes the construction as
proof that this particular triangle is

a

a

right triangle;

the construction proves only a particular conclusion.
The universality of a theorem is derived, it would seem,

from an implicit argument something like this:
1)

A is a right triangle because
tain construction, C.

I

can perform a cer-

2)

On any triangle similar to A,
struction similar to C.

I

can perform a con-
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3)

Therefore, any triangle similar
to A is a right
triangle

Hintikka's objection is that

,

given Aristotle's account

the second premiss of this
argument is false. One can
not always perform the appropriate
construction.
So the
theorem holds, not universally, but
only for those triangles for which the appropriate
construction can be per
formed

Surely this is not right.

When a construction is

carried out, what is demonstrated is that
certain properties of this triangle, (that it is a right
triangle),

follow from certain other properties which
this triangle
is known to have, (having all three
vertices lie
on a

circle whose diameter is equal to the base of
the triangle).
The construction simply shows that these prop-

erties are connected:
c nnected.

indeed, that they are necessarily

But if this is the case, then it follows

straight way that any triangle with the latter property
has the former, without any appeal to the possibility
of

performing constructions in each case.

The construction

shows that the properties are necessarily connected, but
the construction itself is not part of, or essential to,

that connection.

The properties are necessarily connected

in every case, whether there is actually a construction or
not, whether in fact a construction in that particular
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case is even possible or not.
It seems to me, then, that Hintikka's
claim that

Geometry is seriously defective when
done within the
strictures of Aristotle's account of

infinity is not

adequately supported.
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